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The objective of this study is to establish the relevance of audit report lag and its corporate 
governance determinants among listed companies in East Africa. Descriptive statistics were used 
to compare the different audit report lags in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda and to 
establish the relevance of ARL in investment making decisions. Pooled regressions were 
performed to identify the significant corporate governance factors in listed companies in East 
Arica. This study focused on a ten-year period from 2007 to 2016. The findings revealed that of 
the four countries Rwanda had the shortest average ARL, 86 days while Tanzania had the longest 
average, 103 days. The most significant corporate governance factors in Kenya were, gender 
diversity in the board of directors, frequency of audit committee meetings and the auditor type. In 
Uganda, the most significant corporate governance factor was the audit committee financial 
expertise while in Tanzania, the board size and auditor type were the most significant. There were 
no significant corporate governance factors influencing audit report lag in Rwanda. The analysis 
of Primary data revealed that most investors rely on published financials for investment decisions, 
suggesting that ARL could be relevant for investment making decisions. Further analysis of 
information collected from the questionnaires revealed that the competence of the clients’ finance 
team, completeness and quality of information provided to auditors and the type of the audit report 
(qualified or unqualified) highly influenced ARL. There is need for academic scholars to extend 
this research by examining other factors influencing ARL in East Africa. The various regulators 
and policymakers are invited ensure strict adherence to the codes of corporate governance to 
achieve high standards of governance in listed companies. The boards of directors’, management 
and external auditors are encouraged to focus on prompt financial reporting because investors in 
East Africa highly rely on published financial reports to make investment decisions.  This study 
acts the foundation for future research by providing empirical evidence on the relevance of audit 
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 Background of the study 
An audit is an independent examination and expression of opinion on the financial statements of a 
company’s annual report (PCAOB, 2016). Audits are performed to validate that the content and 
the preparation of the financial statements are in conformity to the stipulated standards, legislation, 
regulations and requirements (PCAOB, 2016). In today’s markets, people transact with and in 
corporations that they have limited knowledge about. External auditing is promoted as a trust 
instigating tool that promotes a set kind of social order (Power, 1999). 
There exists two aspects of financial reporting timeliness; first, the frequency of the interim 
reports, and second, the period between the fiscal year end and the annual report signing date. 
Globally, regulators have expressed concerns about both aspects of timeliness, but this paper 
focuses on the later because the Capital Markets’ Authorities in East Africa require that only the 
annual reports be audited. Reporting timeliness is one of the qualitative characteristics of financial 
information, AICPA, (1973); FASB, (1979) and audit report lag is a crucial determinant of 
financial reporting timeliness (Ashton et al., 1989; Givoly & Palmon, 1982 and Abbott et al., 
2012).  
Several studies have examined the factors that influence timeliness. Research by Ika & Ghazali, 
(2012); Owino, (2017) and Abernathy et al., (2017) on audit report lag indicate that auditor related 
attributes, company related factors and corporate governance-related factors affect audit reporting 
timeliness. Studying the drivers of ARL in Kenya, Owino (2017) opined that auditor type was the 
most significant auditor related factor associated with ARL and, the return on assets (ROA) was 
the most significant company-specific factors associated with ARL. Blankley, Hurtt, & 
MacGregor, (2015) found a positive relationship between an extended ARLs and financial books 
restatements. A study of the USA banking industry in 2014 by Alali and Elder revealed that 
company size, profitability, restatement of income, and abnormal audit fees were significant 
determinants of ARL. Afify, (2009) studying 85 Egyptian listed companies observed that the 
independence of the board of directors, CEO duality and the presence of an audit committee were 
significant corporate governance-related factors. Karim et al., (2006) studying the effect regulation 
on the timeliness of reporting in Bangladesh opined that the most significant company-related and 
auditor related factor affecting ARL was lack of sufficient personnel resources. Leventis & 
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Caramanis, (2005) studying the determinants of ARL in Greece used a linear regression model and 
concluded that the appointment of an international auditor was the most significant auditor related 
factor affecting ARL. Handerson & Kaplan, (2000) studying the determinants of ARL in USA 
over a period of six years found that financial loss and size of the company were the most 
significant company-related factors. These studies focussed on both the developed and the 
developing economies. In the developing economies, auditor related factors were significant driver 
of ARL while in the developed economies, company related factors  were significant drivers of 
ARL. There is however no consistency in conclusion about the factors influencing ARL. There 
exist socio-economic, cultural and political differences and no one study on ARL has had its 
findings generalised for all countries (Bokpin, Isshaq, & Nyarko, 2015 and Waweru, Hoque, & 
Uliana, 2004). The divergence in-country legislation, research methodology, variables measured, 
and theories anchored on are some of the factors that explain the inconsistent conclusions on the 
determinants of ARL. 
For a long time, researchers and scholars have studied the corporate governance determinants of 
audit report lag (Knechel Robert & Payne, 2001). Evidence from prior research reveal that CG 
characteristics like board independence, audit committee independence, number of meetings, size 
of the board and CEO duality affect ARL (Apadore & Mohd Noor, 2013; Baatwah, Salleh, & 
Ahmad, 2015 and Henderson & Kaplan, 2000). To the best of the researchers knowledge, studies 
on audit report lag are yet to be done in Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda. This study shall compare 
the length of ARL within the EAC member states and analyze the CG factors influencing ARL. 
The  EAC member states are characterized by developing markets. Beyond published reports, these 
markets have minimal financial information, implying that regulators and users of financial data 
need to understand the drivers of ARL (Leventis & Caramanis, 2005).  
The EAC is made up of six members states; this study shall limit its research to Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Rwanda because South Sudan and Burundi have no securities exchanges. The 
Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE), Uganda Securities Exchange (USE), Dar es Salaam Stock 
Exchange (DSE), and Rwanda Stock Exchange (RSE) are regulated by the various Capital Markets 
Securities Acts. There were seventy-nine listed companies in East Africa as at 31 December 2016. 
Of the seventy-nine, the nine cross-listed companies were; Kenya Commercial Bank, Nation 
Media Group, Centum Investments Limited, Umeme Limited, Jubilee Holdings Limited, Equity 
Bank Limited, East Africa Breweries Limited, Uchumi Limited and Kenya Airways. Legal 
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bonding, market access, lower cost of equity, increased firm value and enhanced cooperate 
governance have motivated firms to cross-list in the East African Stock Exchanges. (Berg, 2012; 
Dodd, 2013 and Cetorelli & Peristiani, 2010). For financial reporting purposes, when control is 
identified, IFRS requires the reporting entity to prepare consolidated financial statements for the 
whole group, presenting the parent and its subsidiaries as a single economic unit, (IFRS 10, 
Consolidated Financial Statements). IFRS 10 provides that subsidiaries be exempted from 
consolidation if; the parent company is part of a superior consolidated group, or is an employment 
benefit plan, or is an investment entity. All the cross-listed companies had their financials 
consolidated by the parent companies in Kenya.  
Studying the Egyptian market in 2009, Afify opined that, for the Capital Market to function 
efficiently, timely financial reports are a necessity, and unwarranted delays in presenting these 
reports increased uncertainty in decision making for investors. This findings were in line with 
research findings by Ashton, Willingham, & Elliott, (1987) who did an empirical analysis on audit 
delay in the USA. Timely reporting enhances decision making and reduces information asymmetry 
in the capital market (Owusu-Ansah & Leventis, 2006). Timely publishing of financial information 
by listed companies is one of the overriding determinants of stock price movement on the stock 
exchange and makes it possible for investors to evaluate the risk and expected returns of their 
stocks (Ohaka & Akani, 2017).  
 Regulatory Environment in the EAC States 
In Kenya, the Companies Act of 1948 embodies the local law governing corporate governance in 
listed companies. The elements of the Kenyan Companies Act were borrowed from England in 
2002 and revised in 2015. In 2002, the Capital Markets’ Authority issued guidelines on good CG 
practices by public listed companies. The guidelines were prepared in recognition of the role of 
corporate performance, capital formation and maximization of shareholders’ value as well as the 
protection of investors’ rights (CMA, 2002). Other regulations that govern listed companies’ 
corporate governance are; the Banking Act (revised 2015) and the State Corporations Act (revised 
2015) and “Guidelines on Corporate Governance Practices “Gazette Notice No. 3,362, issued in 
2002 and replaced in 2015 which summarizes the key issues on principles of good CG practices 
and the recommended best practices.  
In 2001, the Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda (ICGU) published the Recommended 
Guidelines for Corporate Governance in Uganda. In 2003, the Capital Markets Authority published 
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the Capital Markets Corporate Governance Guidelines (2003), governing companies trading their 
securities on the Uganda Securities Exchange (USE). These Corporate Governance Guidelines 
provided the minimum standard for good corporate governance practices by public companies and 
issuers of corporate debt in Uganda. These CG guidelines led to the  establishment of governance 
frameworks that promote domestic and regional capital markets growth, (Capital Markets 
Corporate Governance & Guidelines, 2003) 
Tanzania‘s Companies Act (CA) 2002 provides the framework for governance of corporations in 
Tanzania. The Capital Markets and Securities Authority, (2002) and the Steering Committee 
issued the first guidelines on CG in 2002. These guidelines were similar to those issued in Kenya 
and emphasized the role of the board of directors in corporate reporting (Waweru & Prot, 2018) 
In Rwanda, the  Companies Act 2009 gives the foundational corporate governance framework 
providing for among others, duties of directors, rights of shareholders, protection of minority 
shareholders, maintenance of capital, and reporting requirements such as filing annual returns and 
external audits. The Capital Market Corporate Governance Code No. 9, 2012 provides essential 
provisions for corporate governance. The code applies to all listed companies. The corporate 
governance regulation (No. 06/2008) for financial institutions provides for duties of shareholders, 
requirements for approval of board members, internal audit requirements, conduct of board 
meetings, board committees, responsibilities of management and a code of conduct. 
In Kenya, The Income Tax Act, Cap 470, requires that all companies operating in Kenya file their 
self-assessment return six months (180 days) after the financial year end, (The Income Tax Act, 
1974). Similarly, in Uganda, The Income Tax Act, Cap 340, requires that all companies operating 
in Uganda file their self-assessment return within s six months (180 days) after the financial year-
end. 
The Income Tax Act, Cap 332, section 91 requires that all companies operating in Tanzania file 
their Income tax returns three months (90 days) after the financial year end, this is the case in 
Rwanda. The Income Tax Law, No. 16/2005 of Rwanda requires that all companies operating in 
Rwanda file their Income tax returns by 31 March of the following tax period, (90 days) after year 
end. 
 Audit report lag and corporate governance 
The IASB framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements requires that a 
set of financial statements display; the statement of financial position, statement of comprehensive 
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income and statement of changes in entity (IASB, 2014). This information is valuable, only if it is 
complete, accurate, reliable and timely (Wisna, 2013).   
The sooner the information is disclosed, the more valuable it is, however, there some tradeoffs 
such as inaccuracies are experienced early reporting (McGee & Yuan, 2008).  
Corporate governance is a framework of regulations, structures, processes, cultures, and systems 
which lead to achieving the goals of accountability, transparency, fairness and the rights of the 
principals /stakeholders (Salehi & Alinya, 2017). The theoretical basis of studying corporate 
governance is the agency theory. An agency relationship as an undertaking contract where one 
party (the principal) engage another party (the agent) to perform services on their behalf, this 
involves delegating the decision making authority (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 Problem Statement 
Some researchers argue that timely audited financial information improves the pricing of securities 
Gul, Kim, & Qiu, (2010), limits insider trading and spreading of rumours in the market (Owusu-
Ansah, 2000). Others argue that a longer audit lag can be good news to investors, especially in 
cases where the effectiveness of fraud detection is high, (Yim, 2010). With this inconclusive 
findings, it is crucial for the users of financial information to understand the nature of audit report 
lag in East Africa.  
Advancement in technology has amplified the markets’ reaction to information. Platforms, such 
as online trading have been created to ease access of stakeholders to financial information, 
(Sultana, Singh, & Zahn, 2015). These platforms have; reduced capital flow barriers increased 
market integration, and have contributed to higher market volatility (Sultana et al., 2015). With 
technology advancements, the demand by users of financial statements, to publish timely audit 
reports is ever more essential. 
Delayed disclosure allows investors with unusual detective abilities or wealth to acquire costly 
information. These “well-informed” investors trade on their private information at the expense of 
“less-informed” investors making policymakers voice concerns about the timeliness of public 
information disclosures (Sultana et al., 2015). Audit delay could suggest a strain in the quality of 
client-auditor interaction which could translate into an auditor change, and a negative stock market 
reaction (Krishnamurthy, Zhou, & Zhou, 2006). 
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The EAC member states are characterized by weak governance structures, corruption, and fraud 
(Ntayi, 2013 and Badu & Owusu-Manu, 2010). They have a shortage of skilled human capital 
suggesting that they experience difficulties attracting people with accounting or finance knowledge 
to their audit and other governance committees (Waweru et al., 2011). Weak corporate governance 
structures significantly affect ARL. (Afify, 2009 & Owino, 2017).  Policymakers should, therefore, 
ensure compliance to the stipulated codes of corporate governance among listed companies to 
protect shareholders wealth. 
 Main Research Objectives 
The main research objective of this study was to examine the relevance of audit report lag and its 
corporate governance determinants among listed companies in the East African Community States. 
 Specific Objectives 
The study seeks to address the following objectives:  
1. To compare ARL among listed firms in the East African Community States. 
2. To determine the corporate governance-related factors that influence the Audit Report Lag 
(ARL) among listed firms in the East African Community States   
3. To establish the relevance of ARL in investment making decisions among users of financial 
information in the East African Community States.  
 Research Questions 
1. Is there a significant difference in the extent of ARL among listed firms in the East African 
Community States?  
2. What corporate governance-related factors influence the ARL of listed firms in the East 
African Community States? 
3. To what extent does ARL influence investment making decisions among users of financial 
information in the East African Community States? 
 Scope of the study 
This study sought to examine the relevance of audit report lag and its corporate governance 
determinants on listed companies in East Africa. As at 31 December 2016, the NSE had 64 listed 
companies; the USE had 16 listed companies, the DSE had 26 listed companies and RSE had eight 
listed companies. This research was limited to 632 observations from the 79 listed in the four 
securities exchanges, from 1st January 2007 to 31st December 2016.  
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Responses were sought from investment analysts, auditors, and finance executives of the listed 
firms. 
 Significance of the study 
The findings of this study will be significant in the following ways: 
 To regulators 
This study is critical because regulators of the capital markets are usually involved in the 
formulation of policies that enhance market efficiencies, recently, they have focused on the role 
and responsibilities of audit committees in improving financial reporting including its timeliness. 
Establishing the relevance of ARL to investors will help the regulators justify the resources spent 
in implementing policies and regulations within the EAC community states. 
 To researchers and academicians 
The study examines the relevance of audit report lag and its corporate governance-related factors 
on listed companies in the EAC states. The findings of this study will extend the literature on the 
knowledge of the relevance ARL and CG determinants in Kenya, Ugandan, Tanzanian and 
Rwanda.  
 To Investors 
Emerging markets are characterized by limited information and long audit report lags. With 
remarkable growth in modern technology and advancing business practice worldwide, timely 
reporting is very important and understanding of the difference in ARL among listed companies 
in the EAC states will guide investors in adjusting their investment preferences in good time, 
choose the market to invest in and improve their confidence on the securities market.  
 To Auditors 
Knowledge on the determinants of ARL is likely to provide more insights into audit efficiency 
(Leventis, Weetman, & Caramanis, 2005; Walker & Hay, 2007). The findings of this study should 







This chapter focuses on the theoretical and empirical literature of the relevance of ARL and its 
corporate governance determinants among listed companies in East Africa. A discussion on the 
theoretical and empirical literature will establish the relationship between variables. This chapter 
has three sections. First, a review of the theories related to this study, second, the empirical review, 
based on the study objectives and third, the research gap.   
 Theoretical Literature Review 
There have been inconsistent conclusions on the CG determinants influencing ARL. Some of these 
inconsistencies arise because of the theories on which the researchers base their studies. Theories 
guide the formulation of dependent and independent variables and are therefore cardinal in any 
research.  There are many proposed CG theories proposed as highlighted below:  
The proponents of the stewardship theory argue that managers are good stewards of a corporation 
and are usually motivated to; achieve, be recognized, respect authority, and be ethical, (Nicholas, 
2009).  
The social entity theory looks at the organization as a consortium of political, legal processes and 
as a social entity for pursuing collective goals with public obligations (Gamble & Kelly, 2001).  
Signaling theory explains the behavior in labor markets and the concept of timely financial 
reporting; proponents of this theory argue that there exists information asymmetry, companies are 
usually aware of facts that that investors are not (Watson, Shrives, & Marston, 2002). Managers 
of higher quality firms will want to distinguish themselves from lower quality through timely 
financial reporting (Leventis et al., 2004). Signaling is a response to information asymmetry in 
financial markets.  
The agency theory, an agency relationship is a contractual relationship that arises when one or 
more persons (principles) engage another (agents) to perform services on their behalf (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The delegation of control leads to a potential conflict between the agents 
(managers) and principles (owners), (Otchere, Bedi, & Kwakye, 2012; Hassan, 2016). The theory 
holds that agents (managers) always act in their self-interest as there exists information asymmetry 
(Urquiza, Navarro, Trombetta, & Lara, 2010). 
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The Stakeholder theory argues that companies have the moral responsibility of considering all the 
interested parties affected by their decisions and management should make decisions that benefit 
all its stakeholders (Antonelli, D’Alessio, & Cuomo, 2016).  
The resource dependency theory assumes that; by employing experiences directors, organizations 
are able to control their external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). This theory provided a 
theoretical basis that the board of directors is a resource to the firm Hillman & Dalziel, (2003) and 
that appointing competent directors brings social capital and increases the value of the firm through 
improved performance. 
The Agency theory, Stakeholder theory, and Resource dependency theory guide this study 
because; with delegation of control to the agents, the owners need a competent board of directors 
and an audit committee to enhance monitoring so that management can make decisions that benefit 
all stakeholders. 
 Agency Theory  
Agency theory suggests that, where managers (agents) are conflicted, they are most likely to make 
decisions that maximize their selfish interests and not those of the principals (owners). In this case, 
a monitoring mechanism is put in place as an oversight tool for the owners (Mallin, 2004).  
Proponents of this theory assume that corporations comprise of two participants, the managers and 
shareholders, these two are self-interested and generally unwilling to sacrifice their interests for 
the interests of the others (Daily, Dalton, & Canella, 2003). 
Jensen and Meckling, (1976) opined that a firm is a legal entity and not an individual. Divergent 
intentions of the different players individuals are unified using a framework of contractual 
relationships implying that the agency role of the directors is the governance function in serving 
the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). They do this by ratifying the decisions made by the 
managers and monitoring the implementation of those decisions. CG practices provide 
shareholders some assurance that managers will strive to achieve outcomes that are in their interest 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). There exists both internal and external structures for aligning the 
shareholders and managers interests (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Some internal mechanisms are; an 
effectively structured board, compensation contracts that encourage shareholders orientation, and 
concentrated ownership holdings that lead to active monitoring of executives. Researchers have 
investigated board composition because the monitoring and governance function of the board is 
critical to every firm (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003).  In cases where the internally set monitoring 
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structures for managerial opportunism fails, corporate control is activated and it serves as an 
external control.  
      The agency theory is a relevant theory in this study because the board of directors and audit 
committees is a firm’s monitoring mechanisms in reducing agency problems. Monitoring 
mechanisms include; well defined corporate governance practices, proper management 
performance and the financial reporting processes (Nelson & Shukeri, 2011). 
 Stakeholder Theory 
This theory is an extension of the agency theory. It anticipates that the agents take care of the 
welfare of the principals. This theory posits that there exists many other stakeholders apart from 
shareholders and management should make decisions for the benefit of all stakeholders (Freeman, 
2004). A stakeholder is any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement 
of the organization’s objective (Freeman 1984). They include governmental bodies, political 
groups, trade associations, trade unions, associated corporations, prospective employees, 
prospective customers, and the public at large (Donaldson, Preston, & Preston, 1995).  
Stakeholder theory asserts that management has a social responsibility that requires them to 
consider the interest of all its stakeholders when making decisions companies (Antonelli et al., 
2016).  
The stakeholder theory can also be used to explain the effect of ARL on the share returns in the 
sense that, managers have an incentive to prolong the publishing of audit reports because of the 
required statutory disclosures that prevent them from hiding bad news (Watts, 1992). Stakeholder 
theory suggests that the delay of audit reports sends a ‘silent signal’ for shareholder to divest their 
firms’ shares before the news reaches the market. On the other hand, shorter ARLs imply that good 
news is released into the (Mahajan & Chander, 2008; Nor Izah Ku Ismail & Chandler, 2004).  
The stakeholder theory argues that stakeholders such as regulator can influence the ARL by 
implementing policies that reduce ARL so they can ensure timely financial reporting. Al-tahat 
(2015) employed the stakeholder theory to investigate the association of ARL, firm size, 
profitability, leverage, and auditor type; he observed a significant relationship between 
profitability, auditor type, and ARL. This theory is imperative in our ARL and CG study. 
 Resource Dependency Theory 
The basis of this theory is that organizations depend on their environment for resources and as 
such must establish good relations to ensure a constant flow of these resources and information. 
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The resource dependency theory basis is the fundamental assumption that firms control over their 
environment by bringing on board resources needed to survive (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). This 
theory provided a theoretical basis that the board of directors is a resource to the firm (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). Competent directors bring in social capital resources and advice to management 
on strategic actions (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Al-Rassas & Kamardin, (2015) opine that large audit 
committees exhibit experience and expertise which contribute to the audit committee’s 
effectiveness in monitoring management, hence leading to high earnings quality. 
Empirical studies in the resource dependence tradition have revealed a relationship between board 
directors and a company’s performance (Boyd, 1990; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & EUstrand, 1999 
and Pfeffer, 1972). This theory portends that skills and knowledge of directors are resources that 
strengthen the corporate governance framework.  
 Integrating the different theories. 
The agency theory provides unique, realistic and empirically testable perspectives of the principal-
agent problem (Waweru et al., 2015). This theory posits that whereas the agents are the managers 
and the principals are the owners, the board of directors acts as the monitoring mechanism (Mallin, 
2004). On the other hand, the resource dependency theory perceives the board of directors as a 
means to counter management’s selfish interests, reduce uncertainty and reduce the transactional 
costs that come with interacting with the environment. The stakeholder theory suggests that the 
firm must reflect on the interest of all stakeholders because their varying interests can affect the 
company’s ability to achieve its objectives (Freeman, 2001). This study, therefore, derived its 
dependent variable, audit report lag from the Agency theory and the Stakeholder theory while the 
Resource Dependency theory revealed the significance of the board of directors and the audit 
committee.  
  Empirical Review 
This section reviews documented literature on the corporate governance determinants of audit 
report lag of listed companies in East Africa. The influence of different corporate governance 
determinants has been revealed in studies by (Shafie & Wan-Hussin, 2010; Apadore & Noor, 2013 
and Owino, 2017). Some of the corporate governance determinants studied are different because 
of different legal frameworks and institutional setups in various countries. 
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 Audit Report Lag. 
Research on audit report lag began in the 1970’s. Early studies by Courtis (1976) and Gilling 
(1977) in New Zealand focussed on the relation between earnings announcements and companies’ 
characteristics, such as company size,  company performance, financial risk, and industry sector. 
Further studies observed that audit report lag was influenced by; company size , Ashton et al., 
(1989); Payne  & Jensen, (2002); Ahmad & Kamarudin, (2003); Ismail & Chandler, (2004); 
Dogan, Coskun & Celik, (2007), auditor type Ashton et al., (1989); Knechel & Payne, (2001), 
audit risk Sharma et al., (2007), industry, Ahmad & Kamarudin, (2003); (Afify, 2009) and 
profitability (Ismail & Chandler, 2004; Al-Ajmi, 2008). 
Shukeri & Islam, (2012) investigated the influence of auditor related determinants of ARL such as 
auditor size (big 4 and non-big four international firms), audit opinion (qualified or unqualified) 
and audit technology (auditing computer software). Soltani (2002) examined the effect that 
qualified reports have on ARL over a 10-year period (1986 – 1995), his study revealed that 
companies with qualified audit opinions have longer ARLs compared to the companies with 
unqualified opinions. 
Al-Ajmi, (2008) examined the corporate reports timeliness for the three lags periods; audit lag 
period, interim period and the total of audit lag. Audit lag period was proxied as the period between 
the auditors’signature date and the publication date. His study revealed that company size, 
profitability, industry, and leverage significantly influenced ARL. These findings are consistent 
with findings by; (Ashton et al.,1989; Ismail & Chandler, 2004;  Afify, 2009 and Lee et al. 2008). 
Studying the Egyptian market, Afify (2009), observed that, board independence, duality of CEO 
and existence of audit committee are significantly related to ARL. This suggests that companies 
with robust corporate governance mechanisms have shorter period of audit report lag. Further, the 
study reports that company size, industry and profitability significantly affect audit report lag. 
These findings were consistent with findings by (Naimi et al., 2010). Naimi et al. (2010) observed 
that; firms with large audit committees and regular audit committee meetings have shorter ARLs 
and that audit committee independence and expertise are not associated with the timeliness of audit 
report. 
Studying the determinants of ARL in Kenya, Owino, (2017) observed the banking industry took 
the shortest time to report. These findings were consistent with findings by Henderson & Kaplan, 
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(2000), who observed that financial institutions had shorter ARLs because they operate in a highly 
regulated industry. 
Leventis and Caramanis, (2005), in their study on Greece companies, suggested that any attempts 
to regulate should focus on audit-specific issues, (audit fees or audit hours, proxied by the presence 
of extraordinary items in the statement of comprehensive income, the number of comments on the 
reviewed financials), rather than on the audit client's characteristics. The auditor type, audit fees, 
number of remarks in audit report, extraordinary items and uncertainty of opinion in the audit 
report were significant determinants of audit timeliness.  
Bonson-Ponte et al., (2008) studied the factors that determine delays in the signing of audit reports 
on the Spain Capital Market between 2002 and 2005. They found that highly regulated sectors 
(financial and energy sector) and the size of company affect the audit delay. The type of the audit 
firm, auditors’ qualifications, policy and regulatory changes were not significant determinants of 
ARL in Spain.  
Lopes and de Alencar, (2008) investigated the role of financial reporting features (conservatism, 
timeliness and value relevance). They established that the interactions between corporate 
governance and earnings as well as change in earnings were both positive and significant and 
better-governed firms presented more timely earnings. Cross listing and corporate governance 
arrangements acted as complements to increased timeliness of earnings. Merdekawati and Arsjah, 
(2011), studying ARL in Indonesia concluded that corporate governance and audit opinion 
negatively affect audit lag, whereas firm size positively affected audit lag. Auditor’s firm, 
profitability, price earnings ratio and dividend payout ratio had no significant effect on ARL.  
For capital markets to function correctly; Timely reporting of annual reports is paramount, 
unnecessary delays increase investment uncertainty (Citron et al., (2008). Additionally, 
stakeholders’ legitimate interests are disregarded by delays in reporting (Phillips & Freeman, 
2003).  
Timely financial reporting augments decision-making and reduces information asymmetry in 
capital markets (Owusu-Ansah & Leventis, 2006).  
 Corporate Governance-related factors and their influence on ARL. 
The debate on the potency of corporate governance mechanisms as a means of reducing audit 
report delay has intensified due to the collapse of high profile corporate organizations and 
unending scandals in the corporate world. The significance of reporting timeliness to investors and 
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other stakeholders and the effectiveness of corporate governance in avoiding future corporate 
scandals is now indispensable (Abernathy et al., 2017). 
Scholars have been investigating corporate governance as a determinant of ARL (Nahar Abdullah, 
2006; Al-Ajmi, 2008; Afify, 2009; Abernathy, Barnes, Stefaniak, & Weisbarth, 2017). In 2008, 
Al-Ajmi examined the impact of corporate governance (proxied by ownership concentration) on 
financial reporting timeliness in Bahrain and found no association between corporate governance 
and ARL, however, he observed that issuers with higher ownership concentration had shorter 
delays between financial statements signing date and the publishing date in local media, which 
implied timelier reporting. Similarly, in 2009, Afify reviewed the effect of corporate governance 
on ARL Egypt. Board independence and the presence of an audit committee were inversely related 
with ARL, however, CEO’s duality was  positively associated with ARL. This suggested that 
CEOs delay reporting of financial results that may adversely influence stakeholder perceptions. 
Ghosh and Tang, (2015) studies the audit characteristics of family-owned businesses (‘family 
companies’); contrasting Afify (2009), Ghosh and Tang observed family-owned businesses have 
shorter ARL’s, these findings imply that  family-owned businesses have lower operational risk 
and provide generally higher financial reporting quality. In the recent years, corruption cases in 
the corporate environment have highlighted the importance of strong corporate governance 
structures (Ilaboya & Christian, 2014).   
A robust corporate governance framework is essential for ensuring quality in the financial 
reporting process (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004). Cohen et al., (2004), postulate that 
the key corporate governance players are board of directors, audit committees, external auditor, 
and the internal auditors. The Code of Best Practices (2003) identifies the three ‘key players’ of 
the corporate governance framework as the boards of directors, shareholders and audit committees. 
This study focuses on establishing the corporate governance determinants (board of directors and 
audit committee) of ARL of companies listed in the various EAC member states securities 
exchanges. 
 Board of Directors 
The board of directors is the apex of the corporate structure, and it presumably oversees 
management’s activities and protects the firm’s resources, (Gerde et al., 2017).  Lawler et al. 
(2002) argued that effective board members are; knowledgeable, are updated on company 
information and have the power to counterbalance the chief executive officer (CEO). To note, 
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however, is that for the interests of the shareholders and those of the board of directors to be 
aligned, shareholders may need to provide the board with incentives (Laiho, 2011). 
2.6.1.1 Board Size 
The board of directors is responsible for the review and monitoring of information contained in 
financial statements before publishing; however, large boards face communication problems 
which render them less efficient in monitoring and ensuring timely reporting of financial 
statements than small board (Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010). Larger boards are likely to 
experience the directors' free-rider problem as compared to a smaller board (Jensen, 1993). Mak 
and Li, (2001) argue that directors sitting in  large boards do not optimumly participate in decision 
making, are disorganized and rarely reach an agreement about the audit process and procedures. 
Beasley, (1996) contends that large boards drag the process of decision making; and in effect the 
audit process, he attributed this to the many meetings larger boards hold so they can deliberate on 
the audit process and the audit report date. In line with Beasley’s argument, Abdul-Rahman and 
Mohamed-Ali (2006) argue that board size and audit delay are positively related.  
Contrary to Beasley’s findings, Xie, (2003) and Bradbury, Mak, & Tan, (2006) observed that small 
boards exhibit greater assertiveness and are more responsive, leading to a delay in the audit 
process. The conflicting findings justify the need for further research in the EAC context. The 
Capital Markets Authorities Acts in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda do not prescribe an appropriate 
board size but suggest that it should neither be too large nor too small to hinder the inclusion of 
experts. In Rwanda, the Capital Market Corporate Governance Code requires that board sizes 
range between seven and ten directors, depending on the company size. 
This study hypothesize: 
H1: There exists a positive relationship between board size and ARL 
2.6.1.2 Board Independence 
Agency theorists posit that board independence is crucial for active monitoring and governance of 
a firm. They advocate for outsider dominance (Bacon and Brown, 1973; Firstenberg and Malkiel, 
1980). Insider-dominated boards, by their very nature, cannot be independent of management 
(Jensen, 2005). Fama, (1980) asserts that non-executive directors are highly motivated to perform 
the monitoring role and are a vital internal control. Eisenhardt, (1989); Hermalin & Weisbach, 
(1991); Cho & Kim, (2007) argued that independent boards improve firm performance by 
streamlining the interests of owners and managers and resolving the inherent conflict between the 
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interests of a firm’s owner and its management. In contrast, Donaldson, (1990); Donaldson & 
Davis, (1994), argue that managers are good stewards of organizational resources because they are 
genuinely trustworthy individuals and can be depended upon. Preston, (1995) claimed that senior 
executives will not handicap shareholders for fear of damaging their reputation and human capital.  
The resource dependency theory argues that; executive directors’ esteem non-executive directors 
because they are more knowledgeable about the firm and its industry, and are better networked. 
Executive directors are presumed to be as  diligent as independent directors, given their legal 
responsibility and their vested interest in the firm (Guest, 2008). The Capital Markets Authorities 
of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania stipulate that the board of directors should compose of a balance 
of executive directors and non-executive directors (at least one-third independent and non-
executive directors). In Rwanda, the Capital Market corporate governance code requires that at 
least half of the board be independent.  
From the empirical literature studied, there exist inconsistent observations in the relationship of 
the composition of boards’ directors and corporate performance. The conflicting findings on board 
independence and ARL justify further research in the EAC context and we hypothesize: 
H2: There exists a negative relationship between board independence and ARL 
2.6.1.3 Director’s Tenure 
As discussed in the previous section, the evidence on the effectiveness of director independence is 
inconclusive. Directors are classified as independent if: they have not been employees of the firm 
in the past three to five years, or, have not consulted with the company, or, not had family members 
employed by the company, not been on the board or a manager of a foundation or other 
organization that receives grants or donations from the company, and, have not had any boards 
relationships between the company’s CEO and other directors (Byrd, Cooperman, & Wolfe, 2010). 
Over time, this independence may be affected as directors relate with each other. 
Studies by Vafeas, (2003) noted that the directors’ independence gets compromised over time. He 
observed that long-tenured directors have greater firm and industry knowledge and, thereby, 
enhanced monitoring. Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, (2002) opine that a new outside board member 
may highly regard a CEO and  that long-tenured boards have more company information, more 
industry experience and better in monitoring. Salancik (1977) suggests that organizational 
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allegiance deepens with tenure because employees make certain ‘side bets’ in the organization like 
buying company stocks.  
In contrast, Katz (1982) found that long-tenured board exhibit poor intragroup communication and 
information asymmetry. He also finds that firms’ performance is inversely related director’ tenure. 
Using data for large bank holding companies to develop a CEO allegiance hypothesis, Byrd et al., 
(2010), found that long-tenured CEOs  are more loyal to management and their  allegiance shifts 
away from shareholders.  
This study examines the influence of director’s tenure on ARL using data of listed companies 
within the EAC member states and hypothesizes that: 
H3: There exists a positive relationship between directors’ tenure and ARL. 
2.6.1.4 Gender Diversity 
One of the key aspects of satisfying corporate governance codes is gender diversity (Ferrero, 
Izquierdo, & Torres, 2015; Terjesen, 2008 ). Gender diversity has been championed as a means of 
improving organizational value and performance by bringing in new insights, perspectives, and 
information (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). There has been significant progress in female 
representation in the board of directors in the past two decades (Daily & Dalton, 1999). The 
boardrooms of many organizations have from inception been significantly dominated by men with 
few female representation, both in developed and developing nations, (Şener & Karaye, 2014) 
A study by Robinson & Dechant, (1997) argued that board gender diversity led to better informed 
corporate strategy decisions and in turn affected firm’s performance. Further studies by Shrader, 
Blackburn, & Iles, (1997); Carter et al., (2003) found a positive relationship between gender 
diversity and firm’s performance. In 2009, Adams and Ferreira observed that women are likely to 
be involved in monitoring related committees that increase transparency. Additionally, boardroom 
gender diversity is positively related to audit effort and may reduce the ARL (Srinidhi, Gul, & 
Tsui, 2011). Some studies find that boards with female directors tend to be associated with more 
accurate earning forecast thus, reducing information asymmetry (Gul, Hutchinson, & Lai, 2013) 
Studying listed companies in Kenya, by Owino, (2017) observed no significant relationship 
between gender diversity and ARL, this was contrary to findings by Odit, (2013) who observed a 
positive relationship between ARL and board gender diversity. 
This study hypothesizes: 
H4: There exists a positive relationship between board gender diversity and ARL 
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 Audit Committee 
Reformists and scholars emphasize on the importance of delegating he central oversight, 
accountability, and monitoring of the financial reporting process to the audit committee, they 
however note that the overall responsibility for financial statements reporting lies with the board 
of directors (Sultana, Singh, & Van der Zahn, 2015). The audit committee roles and responsibilities 
have been reinforced by the codes of best practice guidelines introduced globally in the past few 
years. Although there exists various aspects of the corporate governance mosaic,  (Cohen et al., 
2004), the audit committee (AC) mechanism has the closest proximity to the financial reporting 
process. Policy makers and scholars have emphasized the importance of having a functioning AC 
with certain characteristics. Empirical literature has shown that audit committees enhance auditor’s 
independence by monitoring the auditor-client relationship, Carcello, (2000), thus, shielding the 
auditor from managerial retaliation (McMullen, 1996; Carcello & Neal, 2003) and limiting 
earnings management by managers (Klein, 2002).  
In East Africa, the CMA Acts mandate all listed companies to establish audit and board 
committees. The importance of the audit committees has influenced the actions and activities of 
the external auditor, including time taken to issue the audit report. The association between audit 
committee and financial reporting quality has been examined using; fraudulent financial reporting 
Abbott et al., (2000); Beasley et al., (2000), financial reporting restatement Abbott et al., (2004); 
Lin et al., (2006), earnings management, Xie et al., (2003); Bedard et al., (2004); Yang & Krishnan, 
(2005), level of interim financial disclosure, Mangena & Pike, (2005), qualified audit report 
Pucheta-Martinez & Fuentes, (2007) and timeliness of reporting Abdullah, (2006); Afify, (2009).  
Most researchers study a single characteristic of audit committee while examining the relationship 
between audit committees and audit report lag, such as the existence of an audit committee in the 
sample company Afify, (2009), and the number of independent members in the audit committee 
(Abdullah, 2006). In the East African region, listed companies must have an audit committee, the 
study of a single characteristic may not be adequate in assessing the effectiveness of an audit 
committee in influencing financial reporting timeliness. This study fills the gap in the literature by 




2.6.2.1 Audit Committee size 
Proponents of the resource dependence theory argue that, larger audit committees bring in diverse 
experience and expertise, more AC members can better monitor management and improve 
earnings quality. The Cadbury Report (1992), the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) and the Smith 
Report (2003), specify at least three audit committee members. Buchalter & Yokomoto (2003) 
recommend that audit committees be composed of three to five members, this is dependent on the 
firm’s size.  
In East Africa, the Capital Markets Authorities do not specify the minimum number of audit 
committee members but requires that they should not be too few as to compromise on technical 
ability of the committee. Empirical literature suggests that the audit committee size is positively 
related to high earnings quality (Garcia, Barbadillo & Perez, 2010; Lin, Li & Yang, 2006). 
Studying the Malaysian market, Zaluki and Hussin (2010); Ismail et al. (2009) observed a 
significant positive relationship between audit committee size and earnings quality. However, 
Abbott et al., (2003); Abbott, Parker, and Peters (2004); Xie et al., (2003); Baxter and Cotter 
(2009); Adiguzel (2013) observed an insignificant association between audit committee size and 
earnings quality. The resource dependence theorists predicted that the more the audit committee 
members are, the more efficient the internal monitoring and better earnings quality. This study 
hypothesizes that: 
H5: There exists a negative relation between the Audit committee size and ARL. 
2.6.2.2 Audit Committee Independence 
Ideally, for the members of the audit committee and management to efficiently perform their 
duties, they should be independent from each other (Ismail et al., 2009; Krishnamoorthy, 2002). 
Lin et al., (2006) opine that the opportunity for fraudulent reporting is reduced when an 
independent audit committee effectively monitors management. Mustafa and Yusof (2010) argue 
that for an organization to exhibit high financial reporting quality, the audit committee should be 
independent. Beasley & Salterio (2001) observed that companies strengthen their audit committees 
when they include more outside directors in the audit committee than the minimum number 
required by legislation. Klein (2002) observes an inverse relation between a totally independent 
audit committee and the level of earnings management in the US publicly traded companies. 
Peasnell et al. (2005) findings on the UK firms differed from Klein’s (2002). Abbott et al., (2004), 
Bédard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004), Persons (2005) and Archambeault, DeZoort and 
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Hermanson (2008) opined that the independence of the audit committee reduces earnings 
management, lowers the probability of financial reporting restatement and financial reporting 
fraud.  
Additionally, the independence of the audit committee influences the going concern opinion of a 
company (Carcello & Neal, 2000). Krishnan (2005) finds that independent audit committees are 
associated with strong financial reporting controls. Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) observed that 
the independence of the audit committee enhances audit quality by avoiding going concern reports 
and auditor resignations than it is at enhancing accruals quality and avoiding restatements.  
In the four East African Community States, the Capital Markets Authorities require the audit 
committee be composed of at least three independent, financially literate directors, so they can to 
make judgments that are in the best interests of shareholders.  
This study hypothesizes: 
H6: There exists a negative relationship between audit committee independence and ARL. 
2.6.2.3 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
Audit committees are responsible for; understanding the audit procedures, audit risks, audit 
opinions, causes of conflict between management and the external auditor, and reviewing 
judgmental accounting areas. Felon and Salieri (2009) opine that audit committee members are 
financial experts if they; have past employment experience in finance or accounting, or, are 
certified accountants, or, have any other financial oversight experience or backgrounds which 
result in financial sophistication.  
Previous studies show that the companies that suffered fraudulent financial reporting had few AC 
members with expertise in accounting (McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996; Beasley, Carcello & 
Hermanson, 1999). DeZoort and Salterio (2001) observe that audit committee members with 
previous financial reporting and audit experience are more likely to make expert judgments than 
those without. Xie et al. (2003), Abbott et al. (2004) and Bédard et al. (2004) document that audit 
committee financial expertise reduces financial restatements and limits the likelihood of managers 
to engage in earnings management. DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) note that the appointment of 
accounting financial experts propels positive stock market reaction in line with market expectation. 
DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) further note that the audit committee members' financial knowledge 
is crucial for them to execute their role as financial monitors. Krishnan (2005) and Zhang, Zhou, 
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and Zhou (2007) find that firms with weak internal controls had audit committees with less 
financial expertise.  
Most studies suggest that financially knowledgeable audit committee members are more likely to 
prevent and detect material misstatements. Of great concern is that studies on the influence of audit 
committee financial expertise on ARL have not been done in Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania, this 
study shall fill in that gap. The following hypothesis is proffered: 
H7: There exists a negative relationship between audit committee financial expertise and ARL. 
2.6.2.4 Presence of the CEO in the Audit Committee 
Prior studies on audit committees suggest that top management is an integral part of the corporate 
governance mosaic and may have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of the audit committee 
(Beasley et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2010; Carcello et al.,2011; Bruynseels & Cardinaels 2014). 
There have been concerns that audit committees are established for symbolic rather than 
substantive oversight of financial reporting (Lisic et al., 2016).  
The corporate governance guidelines of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania place the 
nomination responsibility on the Nomination Committees, which consist of both executive and 
non-executive directors. This paper sheds light on the influence of the CEOs on ARL by 
specifically investigating their presence in the audit committee.  
Financial reporting is significantly affected by the CEO’s demographic characteristics (Bertrand 
& Schoar, 2003; Francis et al., 2008; Bamber, Jiang, & Wang, 2010). Consequently, reporting 
timeliness can be predicted using these characteristics (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In addition, 
Cheng & Lo, (2008) observed that CEOs have authority and influence what and when information 
should be disclosed. Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010), further argued that CEOs control the style 
of financial reporting disclosure as evidenced by the collapse of Enron, WorldCom. However, as 
evidenced by Jiang et al., (2010); Demerjian et al., (2013); Bamber et al.,(2006) the influence of 
CEOs is not uniform and varies according to their characteristics.  
Prior literature suggests that a CEO is concerned with; strategic, operational and financing 
decisions, Bertrand & Schoar ( 2003), and financial reporting decisions such as earnings 
management and financial disclosures (Bamber et al., 2010; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). 
Although the audit report date is rarely influenced by the CEO, in cases where he has accounting 
knowledge and experience, the annual audit proceeds promptly with fewer errors and required 
adjustments (Jiang et al., 2013). The CEO also signals the degree of professional skepticism and 
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substantive internal testing that the auditor should apply (Cohen et al., 2002). Gibbins et al. (2007) 
observed that the CEO is substantially involved in negotiations with the auditor regarding year-
end accounting issues. Given the potential influence of the CEO on audit risk assessment and the 
negotiation process, audit report timeliness could be affected.  
Nonetheless, we hypothesized that: 
H8: The presence of a CEO in the audit committee is positively associated with audit report lag. 
2.6.2.5 Audit Committee Meetings 
The Corporate Governance guidelines in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania recommends that audit 
committees meet regularly, the frequency is not quantified. In Rwanda, the Capital Market 
Cooperate Governance Code requires that audit committees meet at least every quarter to monitor 
internal and external audits. 
In other jurisdictions like the US through the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) (1999) recommend 
that audit committee meetings should be not less than four in a year. While in the UK the number 
of meetings should be not less than three in a year because companies are required to produce 
interim financial reports semi-annually (Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010). 
Studies posit that independent audit committees are likely to be useful if they are active. One way 
of describing their activeness is regarding the number of meetings held (Menon & William, 1994). 
For the audit committee members to actively address the various changing and challenging 
complexities of the uncertain business and financial environment, they are expected to meet 
frequently (Vafeas, 1999; Bedard et al., 2004; Stewart & Munro, 2007). The more frequent the 
audit committee meetings, the better equipped the members are to detect and prevent opportunistic 
behavior by management, hence integrity of reported earnings (Vafeas, 1999; Bedard et al., 2004; 
Stewart & Munro, 2007). The frequency of audit committees meetings is positively associated 
with the degree of disclosure and discretionary accruals. (Li et al., 2008 and Xie, Davidson III, & 
Dadalt, 2003). Firms that meet less often are susceptible to record fraudulent dealings (Farber, 
2005). Abbott et al. (2004) observed that audit committees that reported less prior period financial 
statement restatement met at least four times a year. However, Lin et al. (2006) found that audit 
committee meetings had insignificant relationship with earnings restatement. The study 
hypothesized: 
H9: There exists a negative association between audit committee meetings and ARL. 
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 Control Variables 
2.6.3.1 Auditor Type 
Prior studies denote auditor type as auditor characteristics. Auditor characteristics refer to the size 
of the audit firm or international link of the audit firm  (Afify, 2009: Carslaw and Kaplan, 1991; 
Gilling, 1977). Contrary to Gilling (1977) who found a significant positive relationship between 
the ARL and the size of the audit firms, Garsombke (1981), Carslaw and Kaplan (1991) and Davies 
and Whittred (1980) found no significant association between the auditor type and ARL. 
Compared to small firms, large audit firms have a larger workforce enabling them perform client 
assignments more efficiently than smaller audit firms (Hossain and Taylor, 1998). This 
observation suggests that small audit firms spend a longer time auditing listed companies. 
Eghliaow, (2013) found that firms audited by big audit firms have shorter lags. Smaller audit firms 
lack capabilities to minimize audit time, while big firms may have the advantage of using efficient 
audit technologies (Newton & Ashton, 1989; Leventis et al., 2005). This study classifies auditors 
into two groups; big 4 (KPMG, EY, PWC, and EY), and other firms. The study hypothesized: 
H10: There exists a negative relation between Auditor Type and ARL. 
2.6.3.2 Board Diligence 
The Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian Corporate Governance Code suggests that the board of 
directors should meet regularly for adequate performance of their roles and. The Rwanda 
Corporate Governance Code is silent on how often the board of directors should meet. Enhanced 
performance is reported when boards meet frequently (Vafeas, 1999). Consistent with Vafeas is 
Conger et al. (1998) who opined that the frequency of board meetings is essential in enhancing the 
efficiency of a board of directors. On the contrary, Jensen (1993) argued that inactive boards with 
few conflicts result to high performing companies. 
The efficiency of the board is associated with the frequency of board meetings (Greco, 2011). A 
higher frequency of board meetings fortifies control over the process of financial reporting 
(Carcello et al., 2002). Hashim & Rahman (2010) revealed that a high frequency of board meetings 
enhances internal controls resulting in decreased ARL. Tauringana, Kyeyune, and Opio (2008) 
reported a significant negative relationship between board meeting frequency and timeliness of 
financial reports. This study hypothesizes that: 
H11: There exists a negative relation between board diligence and ARL. 
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 Research Gap 
Unlike the studies discussed above, this paper investigates the corporate governance determinants 
of audit report lag over the 2007- 2016 period, which is more recent and extensive compared with 
the periods examined by existing studies. The current investigation is an extension to prior studies 
(Ntimet al., 2012a). 
Much research has been done of the determinants of audit report lag in different jurisdictions. None 
has compared the lag in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda, this study shall compare the 
different audit report lags in the ten year period and establish the corporate governance 
determinants causing the differences observed. 
Prior studies show differences in respect of periods, methodology, variables analyzed and 
conclusions obtained. It is inevitable that there exists a gap between the close of the accounting 
period and the date of signing of the audit report, minimizing this gap would improve the efficiency 







Research methodology is the scientific approach used to gather information for answering research 
questions and addressing research objectives (Creswell, 2007). This chapter focuses on the 
research methods used to carry out the study. It starts by defining the research policy underpinning 
the quantitative and qualitative approach taken. The researcher then describes the research design 
adopted, the population and the variables studied. The data collection, data analysis and the various 
econometrics tests carried out are discussed as well as the research quality and ethical 
considerations made before data collection 
 Research Philosophy 
The research methodology and the research philosophy underpinning a study is crucial in 
clarifying various research designs (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). Most research methodologies are 
classified as either quantitative or qualitative (Collis & Hussey, 2003). Collins and Hussey note 
that quantitative methods which relied heavily on objective measures dominated the social and 
behavioral research was in the last two decades.However, in the recent past, a new research 
methodology aligned with a qualitative approach has emerged as a reaction against the dominant 
quantitative methodology. They argue that while the quantitative paradigm implies a positivist, 
objective, scientific and experimentalist approach. The qualitative paradigm implies a subjectivist, 
humanistic and interpretivist approach. In the most basic terms, quantitative research is an 
empirical research in which the researcher explores relationships using numeric data, Fraenkel et 
al., (1993) while qualitative approach involves examining and reflecting on perceptions in order 
to gain an understanding of social and human activities Hussey, (1997), it is subjective in nature. 
Consistent with prior studies,  Hussey (1997); Eghliaow, (2013); Owino, (2017), this study has 
chosen to adopt a quantitative approach (positivist approach) as it is more suited to the purposes 
of this research. This research is interested in explaining the corporate governance determinants 
that influence audit report lag. Levin (1988) argues that through positivism, reality can be observed 
and described objectively since it is stable and does not interfere with the subject of study. The 
positivism approach allows for the use of quantifiable measures of the variables under study 
(Olrlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). In order to test the theories adopted, it also uses the perceptions 
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of the respondents as an indicators of the true situation and is quantified to arrive at a result 
Eghliaow, (2013). 
  Research Design 
Longitudinal, exploratory and descriptive research designs were adopted for this study. With 
longitudinal research design, the researcher can observe a particular phenomenon over a period 
(Creswell, 2007). The trend of audit report lag was studied over a period of ten years (2007-2010) 
to develop a better understanding of ARL within East Africa. Exploratory research is useful when 
there is little information available to guide predictions; it helps develop a better understanding of 
the subject being studied, (Hair, Babin, Money, & Samouel, 2003). Exploratory research was used 
to explain the corporate governance determinants on ARL in East Africa.  Descriptive research 
describes the characteristics of study population (Creswell, 2013), the relevance of audit report lag 
and its corporate governance factors the NSE, USE, RSE, and DSE were comprehensively 
analyzed in this study.  
 Study population and sample selection 
The target population was all listed companies in the NSE, USE, RSE, and DSE. There were 79 
listed firms in East Africa as at 31 December 2016, the number of observations expected was 790 
but due suspension from trading and unavailability of data, only 632 observations were studied. 
We obtained the data from the Capital Markets Authorities libraries of the four countries and the 
different companies’ websites (2007 through to 2016). A census was conducted since the 
population was not significant.
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Table 3. 1: Number of Companies analyzed 
                
Country 




observations   
Companies listed in single markets as at 31 December 2016     
  Kenya    51 398   
  Uganda    8 49   
  Tanzania    16 102   
  Rwanda    3 13   
 
Add:  Cross-listed companies   8 70   
 
Less: Companies suspended from trading  2    
  Companies with no available information -7    
  Companies listed in 2016   -2    
      79 632   
                
 Operationalization of Variables 
This section outlines how we measured the dependent variable ARL and the independent variables, 
CG determinants. Afify (2009) investigated the CG determinants of ARL in Egypt using annual 
reports of 85 listed companies for the year ending 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. He measured 
ARL as the number of days from the financial year end to the audit report date. Using multiple 
regression analysis, Afify modeled ARL as a function of ownership concentration, independence 
of the board, the duality of CEO, the existence of an audit committee, company size, and type of 
auditor, industry, and profitability. This study shall treat ARL as the dependent variable and the 
corporate governance-related factors (board of directors and the audit committee) as independent 
variables. 
Baatwah, Salleh, & Ahmad, (2015) investigated the CEO’s tenure, financial expertise and audit 
reporting timeliness in Malaysia, using a two-stage least square analysis to support the primary 
results. In their research, Baatwah, Salleh, & Ahmad, (2015) measured the CEO’s tenure as the 
number of years that he continuously held his position in a company, this approach has been widely 
used in previous literature (Hazarika et al., 2012; Zhang and Wiersema, 2009) and provides reliable 
results (MacCallum et al., 2002). A CEO is operationalized as a financial expert only if; he holds 
any accounting qualification, or has previously served as an auditor, or as a chief finance officer,  
or as a controller or in other accounting related positions (Baatwah et al., 2015). This study shall 
use this same operationalization for CEO’s tenure and financial expertise 
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Ika & Ghazali (2014), examined the relation between audit committee effectiveness and timeliness 
of reporting in Indonesia. They measured the audit committee effectiveness using an index based 
on the framework developed by DeZoort et al., in 2002, this framework assumed that the four 
elements that determine audit committee effectiveness are its; composition, authority, resources, 
and diligence. DeZoort et al., (2002), defined composition as the requirements needed for one to 
qualify as an audit committee member (independence, capability, education background, and 
experience). Mathuva, Mboya, & Mcfie, (2017) examined the association of the governance of 
credit unions and their social, environmental disclosure in a developing country. The study utilized 
a corporate governance quality index to measure corporate governance quality and an audit 
committee quality index to measure audit committee quality.  
Shukeri and Islam, (2012) studying the determinants of audit timeliness in Malaysia treated board 
independence, AC size, AC meetings, AC qualifications, auditor type, auditors’ opinion and firm 
performance as dummy variables.  Similarly,  Zitouni, (2016) developed an index that constituted 
governance mechanisms as inputs and governance standards from the codes of good practices as 
the outputs. These studies treated the following as dummy variables; board size, independence, 
training of board members, board meetings, audit committee presence, AC size, AC meetings, 
relevant expertise, the presence of compensation committee, CEO presence in compensation 
committee, gender diversity, the presence of other committees, AC financial expertise, auditor 
type and board diligence. In his study on the drivers of ARL among Kenya listed firms, Owino, 
(2017) used the governance frameworks by Mathuva et al., (2016) and Zitouni, (2016) to 
operationalize his variables. 
This study operationalized its variables using the corporate governance framework by ( Shukeri & 
Islam, 2012;  Zitouni, 2016; Owino, 2017).  
Table 3. 2 Operationalization of variables 
Dependent Variable Definition Measure Source 
Audit Report Lag 
(ARL) 
Period from the company’s financial year 
end to audit report date (Lee & Jahng, 
2008) 
Number of days from the 
company’s financial year end to 
audit report date (Afify,2009) 
Listed companies’ 
annual reports 
    
Independent 
Variable 
Definition Measure Source 
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Board Independence The proportion of non-executive 
directors to total number of directors 
Assigned 1 if more than a third are 
independent and 0 if otherwise  
Listed companies’ 
annual reports 
Director’s Tenure Number of years one served as a director 
in the years 
Assigned 1 if more than 10 years 
and 0 if otherwise  
Listed companies’ 
annual reports 
Gender Diversity The proportion of female directors to 
total number of directors (Marimuthu, 
2008) 
Assigned 1 if more than a third are 





Total number of audit committee 
members (Saleh et al., 2007). 






The proportion of non-executive 
directors to total number of audit 
committee members (Saleh et al., 2007). 






Audit committee members possessing 
employment experience in finance or 
accounting or professional certification 
in accounting. (Shukeri & Islam, 2012) 
Assigned 1 if chairperson has 
accounting or finance qualifications 
and 0 otherwise  
Listed companies’ 
annual reports 
CEO’s presence in 
the audit committee 
The CEO is a member of the audit 
committee (Zitouni, 2016) 






The number of audit committee meetings 
held during the financial year (Shukeri & 
Islam, 2012) 




    
Control Variables Definition Measure Source 
Auditor Type Size of the audit firm or international 
link of the audit firm  (Afify, 2009: 
Carslaw and Kaplan, 1991; Gilling, 
1977) 
Assigned 1 for Big 4 and 0 
otherwise (Shukeri & Islam, 2012) 
Listed companies’ 
annual reports 
Board Diligence The number of board meetings held 
during the financial year 




Source: (Shukeri & Islam, 2012; Zitouni, 2016; Owino, 2017) 
 Data collection 
This study used both primary and secondary data. The use of both primary and secondary data 
helps avoid biases from a single source of data (Creswell, 2013).  
Primary data used was semi-structured questionnaire to triangulate the secondary information 
obtained from the annual financial reports, the Capital Markets Authorities, the NSE, USE, DSE 
& RSE handbook and the various company websites. Likert scales were used for structured 
questions as they measured the different aspects of the variables under study, unstructured 
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questions were included, this made it possible to capture relevant information that could have been 
ignored, (Ahlstrom & Westbrook, 1999). 
The researcher facilitated the collection of data by first making phone calls to the respondents to 
seek their permission to participate in this study. Those who agreed, questionnaires were emailed 
in the form of Google docs, (a free web-based application on which the questionnaire was created). 
Google docs is a real-time document authoring tool that allows the respondents submit their 
responses on email. It was used in this study because of the convenience it offered the respondents 
in data collection as they did not have to print and scan their responses. Data was collected between 
1st March 2018 and 31st March 2018. The target respondents were investment analysts, senior 
finance executives, and auditors.  
 Data analysis and presentation  
Data collected from primary and secondary sources was sanitized before analysis, as proposed by 
(Sekaran, 2003). To test the hypotheses developed in the previous section, a multiple regression 
analysis was used modeling ARL as a function of the corporate governance (CG) determinants 
and control variables as below: 
Y= β+δ (Corporate Governance factors+ control variables) +μt………………………….. (1) 
ARL= β0+β1(BS) + β2(D.I) + β3(D.T) + β4(G.D) + β5(ACS) + β6(ACI) + β7(ACFE) + 
β8(CEO.AC) + β9(ACM) + β10(AT) + β11(BD) +μt…………………………………….(2) 
 
Where 
Y-   Audit Report Lag (ARL) 
β0 -   Constraint Coefficient 
BS-    Board Size,  
DI-   Directors’ Independence 
DT-   Directors’ Tenure 
GD-   Gender Diversity 
ACS-   Audit Committee Size 
ACI-   Audit Committee Independence 
ACFE-  Audit Committee Financial 
CEO.AC-  CEO in Audit Committee 
ACM-   Number of Audit Committee Meetings.  
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AT -   Auditor Type 
BD -   Board Diligence. 
μt -   Error term associated with the regression.  
 Estimation techniques and diagnostic tests 
Descriptive analyses were used to analyze objective one which was about the extent of ARL within 
the EAC member states. Typically, descriptive statistics are conducted to provide simple 
summaries about a population or sample (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). 
To test objective two, correlation and pooled regression analysis was used to measure the strength 
of relationship and direction of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. 
Skewness and kurtosis tests were used to test for normality of the data. Multi-collinearity was 
tested using Tolerance coefficients and VIF; Homoscedasticity was tested using Chi-Square while 
autocorrelation will be tested using Durbin Watson test. 
Similar to objective one, objective three was analyzed using descriptive data, collected from the 
distributed questionnaires. 
 Research quality 
 Internal validity 
Internal validity addresses whether or not an observed co-variation should be considered as a 
causal relationship (Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1982). To ensure internal validity, the researcher 
conducted a pilot study in Strathmore University. The questionnaire was issued to five MCOM 
students specializing in forensic accounting, three accounting lecturers, and two investment 
analysts. Feedback from the respondents was useful in improving on the final questionnaire. 
 External validity 
External validity addresses the concern of whether or not a causal relationship should be 
generalized (Calder et al., 1982). Yin (1994) cautions on the generalizability of findings in 
emerging and dynamic markets because forces for and against the area studied are very different 
in emerging markets. This study was generalized to listed company in the NSE, USE, RSE, and 
DSE 
 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical considerations in research is important especially when it involves human beings (Cooper 
& Schindler, 2010). Research ethics is defined as the appropriate behavior of research relative to 
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norms of the society (Zikmund, 2010). Research may have adverse consequences, and therefore 
research subjects have to be protected (Cooper & Schindler, 2010; Patton, 2002; Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2013). This research considered ethical considerations in the following ways. First, 
participation was voluntary, and participants had the freedom to withdraw at any time. Secondly, 
the participants were informed of the purpose of this study and lastly, the identities of the 











This chapter presents the results obtained from the different statistical analyses. The primary 
objective of the study was to establish the relevance of Audit Report Lag (ARL) and its corporate 
governance determinants among listed companies in East Africa. Descriptive statistics were used 
to compare the ARL of listed firms in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda, (objective 1). A 
pooled regression analysis was relied on for the determination of the corporate governance-related 
factors that influence the Audit Report Lag (ARL) among listed firms in East Africa (Objective 
2). Questionnaires distributed to auditors, finance executives, investment analysts, and regulators 
were analyzed to establish the relevance of Audit Report Lag (ARL) in investment making 
decisions among users of financial information in the region. (Objective3). 
 Difference in ARL among listed firms in the East African Community States 
The first objective of this study was to compare the ARL of listed companies in the different 
countries, (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda). 






Minimum Maximum Range N 
Telecommunication and technology 49 13 36 79 43 10 
Commercial Services 98 25 26 202 176 74 
Banking 70 16 37 145 108 103 
Manufacturing and Allied 81 67 26 517 491 50 
Energy and Petroleum 102 17 60 138 78 44 
Construction and Allied 97 31 39 150 111 50 
Agriculture 83 23 54 167 113 50 
Insurance 94 17 58 121 63 47 
Investments 115 41 65 212 147 30 
Automobiles and Accessories 103 21 77 122 45 10 
              
Total 88 34 26 517 491 468 
 
The overall statistics indicate that the Telecommunication and Technology sector had the shortest 
ARL mean in Kenya, with a mean score of 49 days, with a maximum and minimum of 79 days 
and 36 days respectively. The company took about 49 days on average to get the audited financial 
report signed. The only listed Telecommunication and Technology Company in Kenya is 
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Safaricom. In Korea, companies in the Telecommunication and Technology sector had the longest 
ARL (50 days), (Ho-Young Lee & Jahng, 2008). 
The Automobiles and Accessories industry had the longest ARL, with a mean score of 103 days, 
with a maximum and minimum of 122 days and 45 days respectively. The company took about 
103 days on average to get the audited financial report signed. The only listed Automobiles and 
Accessories Company in Kenya is Car and General. 
The Banking industry had a mean ARL of 70 days with a maximum and minimum of 145 days 
and 37 days respectively. In Kenya, banks are highly regulated by the Central Bank, under the 
CBK Prudential Guidelines of 2013. “All institutions licensed under the Banking Act and 
operating in Kenya are required, within three months of the end of every financial year, to publish 
in a newspaper of nationwide circulation between Mondays and Fridays excluding public holidays, 
a copy of their audited statement,” (Central Bank of Kenya, 2013). Banks have a reporting timeline 
of 90 days, and failure to comply attracts a penalty of $10,000, (Central Bank of Kenya, 2013). 
The Insurance industry had a mean ARL of 94 days with a maximum and minimum of 121 days 
and 58 days respectively. This industry is highly regulated by the Insurance Regulatory Authority. 
The Guideline to the Insurance Industry on External Auditors, IRA/PG/14 of 2013 stipulates that 
the insurer should submit its audited management accounts within three months (90 days) of the 
end of the financial year (Insurance Regulatory Authority, 2013). From the table above, we observe 
that some insurance companies were not, the insurance industry mean ARL was 94 days above the 
stipulated 90 days’ timeline. 
The Income Tax Act, Cap 470, requires that all companies operating in Kenya file their self-
assessment return within six months (180 days) of the end of every financial year, (The Income 
Tax Act, 1974). From the descriptive statistics above, some companies in the commercial services 
and the manufacturing and allied industries were not compliant to this regulation. Non-compliance 
attracts fines and penalties.
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Deviation Minimum Maximum Range N 
Commercial Services 106 29 78 145 67 7 
Banking 80 21 38 119 81 21 
Manufacturing and Allied 51 8 45 56 11 2 
Energy and Petroleum 84 5 78 90 12 4 
Construction and Allied 137 28 115 181 66 7 
Insurance 127 40 76 209 133 8 
       
Total 99 35 38 209 171 49 
 
The overall statistics indicate that the Manufacturing and Allied Industry had the shortest ARL 
mean in Uganda, with a mean score of 51 days, with a maximum and minimum of 56 days and 45 
days respectively. The company took about 51 days on average to get the audited financial report 
signed. The only listed Manufacturing and Allied Company in Uganda is British American 
Tobacco. The company was listed in year 2000 but first published its financials is 2015. 
The Construction and Allied industry had the longest ARL, with a mean score of 137 days, with a 
maximum and minimum of 181 days and 115 days respectively. The companies took about 137 
days on average to get the audited financial report signed.  
The Banking industry had a mean ARL of 80 days with a maximum and minimum of 119 days 
and 38 days respectively. In Uganda, banks are highly regulated by the Bank of Uganda, which is 
the Central Bank of Uganda. “A financial institution shall within three months after the end of its 
financial year, submit to the Central Bank its audited annual financial statements approved by its 
board of directors together with the auditors’ report and the management letter,” (Financial 
Institutions Act, 2004). Banks have a reporting timeline of 90 days, and failure to comply attracts 
a penalty of twenty currency points for every day on which the default continues, (Financial 
Institutions Act, 2004). 
The Insurance industry had a mean ARL of 127 days with a maximum and minimum of 209 days 
and 76 days respectively. This industry is highly regulated by the Insurance Regulatory Authority. 
The Insurance Act of 2011, Cap 213 stipulates that the insurer should submit its audited 
management accounts within three months (90 days) of the end of the financial year. From the 
table above, we observe that some insurance companies were not, the insurance industry mean 
ARL was 127 days above the stipulated 90 days’ timeline. 
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The Income Tax Act, Cap 340, requires that all companies operating in Uganda file their self-
assessed return within six months (180 days) of the end of every financial year. From the 
descriptive statistics above, some companies in the construction and allied and Insurance industries 
were not compliant to this regulation. Non-compliance attracts fines and penalties. 




Minimum Maximum Range N 
Commercial Services 95 32 66 153 87 23 
Banking 90 8 73 109 36 25 
Manufacturing and Allied 99 35 38 181 143 25 
Energy and Petroleum 192 67 81 293 212 11 
Construction and Allied 82 23 43 136 93 18 
              
Total 103 46 38 293 255 102 
 
The overall statistics indicate that the Construction and Allied Industry had the shortest ARL mean 
in Tanzania, with a mean score of 82 days, with a maximum and minimum of 136 days and 43 
days respectively. The company took about 82 days on average to get the audited financial report 
signed. The only listed Construction and Allied Companies in Tanzania were Tanga Cement and 
Tanzania Portland. 
The Energy and Petroleum industry had the longest ARL, with a mean score of 192 days, with a 
maximum and minimum of 293 days and 81 days respectively. The companies took about 192 
days on average to get the audited financial report signed.  
The Banking industry had a mean ARL of 90 days with a maximum and minimum of 109 days 
and 73 days respectively. In Tanzania, banks are highly regulated by the Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act, Cap 342. “Every bank shall publish its audited annual financials within fifteen 
days after approval of the board of directors but not later than one hundred and five (105) days 
after the end of the financial year,” (Banking and Financial Institutions, Publication of Financial 
Statements, Regulations, 2008). Banks have a reporting timeline of 105 days, and failure to comply 
attracts a penalty of one million shillings for every day during which such failure continues, 
(Banking and Financial Institutions, Publication of Financial Statements, Regulations, 2008). 
The Income Tax Act, Cap 332, section 91 requires that all companies operating in Tanzania file 
their Income tax returns within three months (90 days) of the end of every financial year. These 
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returns are based on audited accounts. From the descriptive statistics above, non of the industries 
fully complied to this as each industry had companies exceeding ARLs of 90 days. Non-
compliance attracts fines and penalties. 




Minimum Maximum Range N 
Telecommunication and 
technology 
86 4 83 89 6 2 
Banking 80 10 67 90 23 5 
Manufacturing and Allied 86 14 57 105 48 8 
              
Total 84 12 57 105 48 15 
 
The overall statistics indicate that the Banking Industry had the shortest ARL mean in Rwanda, 
with a mean score of 80 days, with a maximum and minimum of 90 days and 67 days respectively. 
The bank took about 80 days on average to get the audited financial report signed. These findings 
were consistent with Abidin & Ahmad-Zaluki, (2012) who found that compared to other sectors, 
banks had the shortest ARL in Malaysia (77 days). The only listed bank in Rwanda was Bank of 
Kigali. In Rwanda, banks are regulated by the National Bank of Rwanda. Article 71, of Law No. 
48/2017 requires banks to provide the audited financials to the National Bank of Rwanda when 
requested to. There is no publishing requirement in Rwanda.  
The Income Tax Law, No. 16/2005 requires that all companies operating in Rwanda file their 
Income tax returns by 31 March of the following tax period, (90 days after year-end).  All 
companies in Rwanda have 31 December year ends. From the table above, Bralirwa Limited, the 
only company in the manufacturing and Allied industry was not compliant in years 2011 and 2012. 
Table 4. 5 Summary descriptive statistics- ARL in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda 
Country 
ARL 





Minimum Maximum Range 
Tanzania 103 102 46 38 293 255 
Uganda 99 49 35 38 209 171 
Rwanda 86 13 10 67 105 38 
Kenya 88 468 34 26 517 491 
              




Table 4.5 presents a comparison of the descriptive statistics of the four countries. The findings 
reveal that Rwanda had the shortest ARL, with an average of 86 days (standard deviation of 34 
days) while the Tanzania had the longest ARL, with an average of 103 days (standard deviation of 
46 days). Uganda had an ARL of 99 days, (standard deviation of 35 days) while Kenya had an 
ARL of 88 days (standard deviation of 10 days).  
In Tanzania, the Income Tax Act, Cap 332, section 91 requires that all file their Income tax returns 
within three months (90 days) of the end of every financial year, a mean ARL of 103 days indicate 
that some companies in Tanzania are non-compliant. Both the Income Tax Act, Cap 470 and the 
Income Tax Act, Cap 340 require that all companies operating in Kenya and  Uganda respectively 
file their self-assessment returns within six months (180 days) of the end of every financial year, 
the mean ARLs of 88 days and 99 days indicated compliance to the tax regulations. The Income 
Tax Law, No. 16/2005 requires that all companies operating in Rwanda file their Income tax 
returns by 31 March of the following tax period, (90 days after year-end), the 86 days ARL 
indicated compliance to the tax regulations. 
When compared to ARLs in other countries like; Egypt 67 days Afify, (2009), Zimbabwe 62 days 
Owusu-Ansah, (2000), USA 59.36 days Lee et al., (2009), Canada 54 days Newton & Ashton, 
(1989), the mean period of ARL among the East African listed companies seems to be longer. The 
reason could be due to the differing regulatory and statutory timelines within East Africa.  
 The corporate governance-related factors that influence the Audit Report Lag (ARL).  
To determine the corporate-governance determinants that influence ARL among companies listed 
in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda, secondary data was analyzed using pooled regression 
analyses. Diagnostic tests were conducted before the regression analysis. 
 Goodness of fit of the model 
The goodness of fit of a model evaluates how good, reliable and valid the model is for prediction. 
We used the R squared, Standard error of estimate (S.E.) and the F-test statistic to evaluate the 
goodness, reliability, and validity of our models.  
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Table 4. 6: Goodness of fit of the regression model- East Africa 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 






Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .379a .144 .127 34.08198 .144 8.659 12 619 .000 
  
Table 4.6 indicates that the predictor variables account for 14.4% of the model variation with an 
R- Squared of 0.144. The model predicts the observed data at 37.9%.  
Table 4. 7 Analysis of Variance- East Africa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
 Regression 120693.542 12 10057.795 8.659 .000a 
Residual 719019.034 619 1161.582   
Total 839712.576 631    
 
The model developed is a good fit, the F- Statistic is 8.659 which is higher than 1, with a 
significance level of 0.000 which is less than 0.05. The overall significance of regression model is 
measured by the F-test (Gujarati, 2012, Brooks, 2012), the model is significant since the p-value 
of the f-statistic is less than the level of significance, in this case, 0.05. 
 Test for Heteroscedasticity 
To adjust for Heteroscedasticity, the dependent variable (ARL) was transformed to logs. Brooks, 
2012 and Wooldridge, (2012) suggest that in cases of Heteroscedasticity, the variables can be 
converted to logs. After transformation, the P- values of F and Chi-square (both 0.0000) indicated 
that the residual variables are heteroscedastic, they had values less than 0.05. This study failed to 
reject the null hypothesis. Autocorrelation and multi-collinearity tests are further tested. 
This study applied white’s test using Eviews 7.0, the null hypothesis of Heteroskedasticity is 
rejected if the probability of the test statistics is significant, (p-value > 0.05).  Heteroscedasticity 
exists when errors do not have a constant variance (Wooldridge, 2012).  
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 Autocorrelation Test 
Autocorrelation is said to exist if the disturbance terms are not equal to zero, leading to incorrect 
standard errors (Brooks, 2012). A data set is considered free of autocorrelation if the statistic is 
within the range of 1.5 and 2.5 (Gujarati & Porter, 2014). Consistent with prior studies the Durbin-
Watson test was used to check for auto-correlation (Fatwah et al., 2015; Sultana et al., 2015) and 
the study statistics were within the range. 
Table 4. 8: Serial Auto-correlation Test 
Durbin Watson Statistic 
Model Durbin-Watson 
1 1.9634a 
 Test for multicollinearity. 
Multi-collinearity exists when two or more variables are highly correlated with each other (Brooks, 
2012). Studies by Gujarati & Porter, (2008) and Dao & Pham, (2014) show that multicollinearity 
may be a problem if the Variance Inflation Factor, (VIF) exceeds 10 and Tolerance goes below 1. 
Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, (2013) and Mardikyan & Çetin, (2008) opined that the regression 
coefficients were poorly estimated if the VIF exceeded 5, (tolerance <0.20). In Table 4.9, the VIF 
of the independent variables ranged between 1.052 and 3.969 while the Tolerance values ranged 
between 0.252 and 0.961, both values proved that there was no multi-collinearity 
Table 4. 9: Multi-collinearity check using Tolerance and VIF 
Model 
95.0% Confidence 




Bound Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 2.030 2.167     
Board Size -0.044 0.007 0.790 1.266 
Independent Directors 0.027 0.084 0.949 1.054 
Dir Tenure -0.053 0.006 0.945 1.058 
Gender Diversity -0.125 -0.011 0.938 1.067 
AC Size -0.047 0.041 0.252 3.963 
AC Independent Dir -0.040 0.050 0.249 4.019 
AC Fin. Expertise -0.068 0.018 0.830 1.204 
CEO.AC -0.066 -0.007 0.935 1.069 
AC Meeting -0.049 0.008 0.737 1.357 
Board Meetings -0.080 0.012 0.915 1.093 
Auditor Type -0.167 -0.093 0.932 1.073 
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 Normality Tests 
The study used the Kolmogorov Smirnov and Shapiro Wilk's tests of to test for normality. 
Observations made on table 4.10 imply that the data distribution is not normal, the P value is less 
than 0.05 at 5% significance. 
Further analysis into skewness and kurtosis to test for normality revealed that that the data 
distribution was not normal.  Asymmetric distribution should be zero (Gujarati & Porter, 2009).  
The Z- values in Table 4.11 (statistic/standard error) were extracted from SPSS, and the descriptive 
statistics suggest that the data is slightly skewed to the right with flat distribution. 
These findings are consistent with previous research (Owino, 2017). Violation of the normality 
assumption in large asymptotic data is of little consequence (Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012). Large 
refers to a sample larger than 30 or 40, (Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012). 
The bell-shaped histogram and normal Q-Q plot were used to check for normality visually and 
suggested normal distribution. 
Normality Tests 
Table 4. 10: Kolmogorov Smirnov and Shapiro Wilk's tests 
  Kolmogorov-
Smirnova     
Shapiro-
Wilk     
  
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
ARL .073 632 .000 .972 632 .000 
 
Table 4. 11: Skewness and Kurtosis 
 N Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
ARL 632 0.403 .097 2.388 .194 









 Correlation Analysis  
Consistent with Afify, (2009) and Owino, (2017), Pearson’s correlation analysis was performed 
among the observed variables. All the independent variables had a negative relation to ARL apart 
from the number of independent directors, (coefficient=0.134, p-value=0.01). The observation is 
consistent to findings by (Afify, 2009, Odit, 2013 & Owino, 2017). All the audit committee 
variables are negatively associated with ARL; this could imply that an audit committee is vital in 
strengthening communication between management and the external auditor, and influences 
auditors’ assessments of risks, audit hours and financial reporting, which subsequently shortens 
the ARL, (Afify, 2009).     
 Regression Model: 
This study used pooled regression method to identify the corporate governance-related factors that 
influence ARL. The use of pooled regression was consistent with studies by Afify, (2009); Al-
tahat, (2015); Ika & Ghazali, (2012), in their study of ARL. The ARL was transformed into natural 
logs to adjust for the diagnostic tests. Positive coefficients denote a positive relationship between 
the ARL and the independent variable while a negative coefficients denote negative relationships. 
4.3.7.1 Kenya 





Square F Sig. 
Regression   1.64 11.00 0.15 8.17 .000a 
Residual   8.33 456.00 0.02     
Total   9.98 467.00       
The model developed is a good fit, the F- Statistic is 8.659 which is greater than 1, with a 
significance level of 0.000 which is less than 0.05. The overall significance of regression model is 
measured by the F-test (Gujarati, 2012, Brooks, 2012), the model is significant since the p-value 
of the f-statistic is less than the level of significance, in this case, 0.05. 
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Table 4.13 indicates that the predictor variables account for 14.4% of the model variation with an 
R- Squared of 0.144. The model predicts the observed data at 40.6%.  






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant)   2.13 0.06  38.60 0.00 
       
Board Size   -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -1.56 0.12 
Ind. Directors   0.03 0.02 0.10 2.13 0.03 
Dir. Tenure   -0.03 0.02 -0.08 -1.88 0.06 
Gender. Diversity   -0.09 0.03 -0.14 -3.13 0.00 
AC. Size   -0.03 0.02 -0.09 -1.01 0.31 
AC. Independence   0.03 0.03 0.11 1.30 0.19 
AC. Fin. Expert   0.01 0.04 0.02 0.33 0.74 
CEO.AC   -0.03 0.02 -0.09 -1.96 0.05 
AC. Meeting   -0.05 0.02 -0.15 -3.01 0.00 
Board. Meetings   -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.49 0.63 
Auditor. Type   -0.17 0.02 -0.36 -7.92 0.00 
In Kenya, the number of independent directors in the board, directors’ tenure, gender diversity, 
presence of the CEO in the audit committee, frequency of audit committee meetings and the auditor 
type were the significant determinants of ARL. This was evidenced by the significant t-statistic 
(p<0.05). Of the eleven variables tested; the number of independent directors in the board, audit 
committee independence and audit committee financial expertise had a positive relation to ARL.  
4.3.7.2 Tanzania 





Square F Sig. 
Regression   0.97 11.00 0.09 4.97 .000a 
Residual   1.60 90.00 0.02     
Total   2.57 101.00       
The model developed is a good fit, the F- Statistic is 4.97 which is greater than 1, with a 
significance level of 0.000 which is less than 0.05. The overall significance of regression model is 
measured by the F-test (Gujarati, 2012, Brooks, 2012), the model is significant since the p-value 






















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1.00 .615a 0.38 0.30 0.13 0.38 4.97 11.00 90.00 0.00 
Table 4.16 indicates that the predictor variables account for 38% of the model variation with an 
R- Squared of 0.3. The model predicts the observed data at 61.5%.  






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant)   2.05 0.11   18.26 0.00 
       
Board. Size   -0.12 0.04 -0.37 -3.34 0.00 
Ind. Directors   0.13 0.10 0.16 1.25 0.22 
Dir. Tenure   0.10 0.05 0.22 2.10 0.04 
Gender. Diversity   0.28 0.17 0.17 1.63 0.11 
AC. Size   -0.12 0.17 -0.33 -0.71 0.48 
AC. Ind   0.05 0.17 0.13 0.28 0.78 
AC. Fin. Expert   0.10 0.04 0.25 2.56 0.01 
CEO.AC   -0.06 0.05 -0.13 -1.30 0.20 
AC. Meeting   0.06 0.03 0.20 1.93 0.06 
Board. Meetings   0.02 0.04 0.07 0.61 0.55 
Auditor. Type   -0.28 0.06 -0.47 -4.68 0.00 
In Tanzania, the board size, directors’ tenure, audit committee financial expertise the auditor type 
were the significant determinants of ARL. The observation was evidenced by the significant t-
statistic (p<0.05). Of the eleven variables tested; only the board size, audit committee size, 
presence of the CEO in the audit committee and auditor type had a negative relation to ARL.  
4.3.7.3 Uganda 
Table 4. 18: Analysis of Variance 
Model Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Regression   0.50 10.00 0.05 2.95 .008a 
Residual   0.65 38.00 0.02     
Total   1.15 48.00       
The model developed is a good fit, the F- Statistic is 2.95 which is greater than 1, with a 
significance level of 0.008 which is less than 0.05. The overall significance of regression model is 
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measured by the F-test (Gujarati, 2012, Brooks, 2012), the model is significant since the p-value 
of the f-statistic is less than the level of significance, in this case, 0.05. 















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1.00 .661a 0.44 0.29 0.13 0.44 2.95 10.00 38.00 0.01 
Table 4.19 indicates that the predictor variables account for 44% of the model variation with an 
R- Squared of 0.44. The model predicts the observed data at 66.1%.  






t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant)   2.13 0.22   9.54 0.00 
       
Board. Size   0.01 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.90 
Ind. Directors   0.03 0.08 0.07 0.41 0.68 
Dir. Tenure   -0.05 0.09 -0.08 -0.61 0.55 
Gender. Diversity   0.12 0.14 0.16 0.85 0.40 
AC. Size   -0.09 0.07 -0.31 -1.41 0.17 
AC. Ind   0.22 0.08 0.64 2.70 0.01 
AC. Fin. Expert   -0.22 0.07 -0.66 -3.23 0.00 
AC. Meeting   -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.11 0.91 
Board. Meetings   -0.11 0.20 -0.11 -0.58 0.56 
Auditor. Type   0.06 0.06 0.18 0.97 0.34 
In Uganda, the audit committee independence and audit committee financial expertise the auditor 
type were significantly related to ARL as evidenced by the significant t-statistic (p<0.05). Of the 
eleven variables tested; only the directors’ tenure, audit committee size, audit committee financial 
expertise, audit committee meetings and board meetings had a negative relation to ARL 
4.3.7.4 Rwanda 





Square F Sig. 
Regression   0.02 5.00  0.00 2.37 .146a 
Residual   0.01 7.00  0.00     
Total   0.03 12.00        
The model developed is not a good fit, though, the F- Statistic is 2.95 which is greater than 1, the 
significance level is 0.146 which is greater than 0.05. The overall significance of regression model 
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is measured by the F-test (Gujarati, 2012, Brooks, 2012), the model is not significant since the p-
value of the f-statistic is less than the level of significance, in this case, 0.05. 












Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1.00 .793a 0.63 0.36 0.04 0.63 2.37 5.00 7.00 0.15 
Table 4.22 indicates that the predictor variables account for 63% of the model variation with an 
R- Squared of 0.63. The model predicts the observed data at 79.3%. 






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant)   1.94 0.03   70.87 0.00 
       
Board. Size   -0.09 0.05 -0.89 -1.65 0.14 
AC. Ind   0.08 0.04 0.76 1.87 0.10 
AC. Fin. Expert   -0.02 0.04 -0.17 -0.38 0.72 
AC. Meeting   -0.03 0.05 -0.31 -0.55 0.60 
Board. Meetings   0.03 0.03 0.24 0.96 0.37 
In Rwanda, none of the variables is significantly related to ARL, the t- statistic for all the variables 
is greater than 0.05 (p>0.05). The findings implies that there exist other determinants of ARL in 
Rwanda other than corporate governance factors. 
Table 4. 24: East African Community States Coefficients Summary 
Model   Regression Analysis Coefficients Summary 
    Kenya Tanzania Uganda Rwanda 
          
H1: Board. Size  -0.07 -0.37 0.02 -0.09 
H2: Ind. Directors  0.10 0.16 0.07  
H3: Dir. Tenure  -0.08 0.22 -0.08  
H4: Gender. Diversity  -0.14 0.17 0.16  
H5: AC. Size  -0.09 -0.33 -0.31  
H6: AC. Ind  0.11 0.13 0.64 0.08 
H7: AC. Fin. Expert  0.02 0.25 -0.66 -0.02 
H8: CEO.AC  -0.09 -0.13   
H9: AC. Meeting  -0.15 0.20 -0.02 -0.03 
H10: Board. Meetings  -0.02 0.07 -0.11 0.03 
H11: Auditor. Type   -0.36 -0.47 0.18  
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 Relevance of audit Report Lag 
 Reliability Analysis 
Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient was relied on to determine the reliability of the questionnaire.  
Studies by Cortina (1993), Howarth & Westhead, (2003) and Cheng & Pike, (2003) suggested the 
use of Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient to test for the internal reliability of an instrument. 
A Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.841 for 22 items indicate high internal consistency of the scale. 
Table 4. 25: Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardized Items      No. of Items 
.869 .841 22 
 
 Response Rate 
A total of 210 questionnaires were emailed on google docs; two questionnaires to 75 listed 
companies, one to the senior finance officials and one to the internal audit department, 20 to 
investment analysts in Nairobi, 20 to external auditors and 20 to the various regulators. Out of the 
209 questionnaires issued, 116 responded giving a response rate of 55.2%. 
 Demographics 
52.6%, N=61 of the respondents were female while 47.4%, N=55 were male. 24.8%, N=28 were 
senior accountants, 19.5%, N=20 were external auditors, 13.3%, N=15 were internal auditors, 
14.2%, N=16 were finance managers, 20%, N= 23 were finance analysts and tax accountants, 
8.2%, N=14 were in other related professions. 
62.9%, N=73 had 5-10 years of working experience, 28.4%, N=33 had worked for between1-4 
years, 5.25%, N=6 had worked for less than 1 year while 4%, N=4 had over 11 years of working 
experience. The findings revealed that majority of the respondents had CPA as a professional 
qualifications represented by 86.2%, N=100. Those with ACCA qualifications were 5.3%, N-6. 
The remaining 8.5% N=10 had either CFA, CISA, AIIK or CIMA qualifications. The respondents 
had the necessary knowledge to comprehend the questionnaire. 
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 Relevance of ARL in investment making decisions among users of financial 
information  
Respondents were asked 6 questions to find out the relevance of Audit Report Lag in their 
investment decisions on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 where 1- Strongly Disagree, 2- Disagree,3- Neutral, 
4- Agree 5-Strongly Agree. The responses are summarized in Table 4.26 below: 

















The time taken for the auditor to review 
and sign greatly influences investment 
decisions.   6.03% 10.34% 10.34% 53.45% 19.83% 3.71 1.09 
Early signing of auditor’s report 
enhances the quality of financial 
reporting. 8.62% 20.69% 12.07% 37.93% 20.69% 3.41 1.27 
Investment decisions are influenced by 
financial reporting timelines set by the 
various regulators.   2.59% 10.34% 13.79% 51.72% 21.55% 3.79 0.98 
Published financials are a major source 
of information necessary for 
investment decisions. 0.86% 4.31% 2.59% 43.10% 49.14% 4.35 0.80 
There is a higher preference for 
investing in the financial services 
sector (banking and insurance). 0.00% 12.07% 31.03% 36.21% 20.69% 3.59 0.93 
There is a higher preference for 
investing in the Consumer and 
Industrial markets (FMCG, 
Telecommunication, Energy) 2.59% 10.34% 40.52% 38.79% 7.76% 3.38 0.86 
From Table 4.26 above, the study observes that published financial statement constitute a 
significant source of information necessary for investment decisions in East Africa with an 
observed mean of 4.35, with a standard deviation of 0.8. More than 92% of the respondents agreed 
that published financial statement are a significant source of information for them to invest. 
The respondents were further asked to rank the extent to which the financial factors influence their 
investment decision making. (1- To a very small Extent, 2- To a small extent,3- To a moderate 






 Table 4. 27: Financial factors that influence investment decisions 

















Past Dividends 2.59% 6.03% 19.83% 46.55% 25.00% 3.84 0.95 
Financial ratios  1.72% 2.59% 23.28% 41.38% 31.03% 3.97 0.90 
Recent Financial  0.86% 2.59% 7.76% 52.59% 36.21% 4.21 0.76 
Performance Bonus given in 
recent years  
3.45% 17.24% 25.00% 36.21% 18.10% 3.48 1.08 
Daily reports of stock exchanges 
on gainers and losers 
2.59% 7.76% 19.83% 33.62% 36.21% 3.93 1.05 
From Table 4.27 above, the study observes that information in the recently published financial 
statements is a major influencer of investment decisions in East Africa. The observed mean is 4.21, 
with a standard deviation of 0.76, more than 88% of the respondents rely on information in the 
recently published financial statements for investment decisions. 
From tables 4.26 and 4.27 above, it is evident that investors in the East African region rely on 
published financial accounts to make investment decisions. Timely corporate financial reporting 
is an essential ingredient for a well-functioning capital market (Ettredge et al., 2005) and undue 
delay in releasing financial statements increases uncertainty associated with investment decisions 
(Ashton et al., 1987). Developing markets are characterized by limited financial information and 
investors significantly rely on the published reports to make decisions (Afify, 2009), therefore in 
times of delay; the market speculates presence of bad news being concealed by managers of the 
company (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991). One way of delaying bad news is delaying the audit report 
(Alkhatib & Marji, 2012 and Patrick & Benjamin, 1994). 
 Chapter Summary 
The chapter began with the comparison of ARLs in East Africa using descriptive statistics. It was 
observed that Rwanda has the shortest ARL (86 days) while Tanzania had the longest ARL (103 
days). A pooled regression analysis was used to identify the corporate governance factors that 
influence ARL; the findings varied on a country to country basis. The relevance of ARL for 
investment decisions cannot be underscored, evidenced from primary data collected and analyzed, 
this study contends that timely financial reporting is essential ingredient for a well-functioning 
capital market (Ettredge et al., 2005) and undue delay in releasing financial statements increases 




DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Introduction 
This chapter presents a summary of the study, conclusions, recommendations and policy 
implications, limitations of the study and suggestions for future research. 
 Summary 
The primary objective of this study was to establish the relevance of audit report lag and its 
corporate governance determinants among listed companies in the East African Community States. 
To address this objective, longitudinal, exploratory and descriptive research designs were adopted 
for, relying on both primary and secondary data. 
In chapter one, the background of the study and the problem being resolved were discussed. The 
primary objective of the study and the three specific objectives were highlighted. The contribution 
of the study to theory and practice was also elaborated.  
A detailed literature review was discussed in chapter two. This study derived its dependent and 
independent variables, and hypotheses from the agency theory, stakeholders’ theory, and resource 
dependency theory, all discussed in chapter two. 
The research methods used to carry out the study were discussed in chapter three. The research 
policy underpinning the quantitative and qualitative approach taken was discussed. This study 
adopted a quantitative approach (positivist approach) as it is more suited to explain the corporate 
governance attributes behind audit report lag. The researcher then described the research design 
adopted, the population and the variables studied. The data collection, data analysis and the various 
econometrics tests to be carried out were discussed as well as the research quality and ethical 
considerations made. 
Data analysis, presentation, and interpretation was discussed in chapter four.  Descriptive statistics 
were used to compare the difference in length of the audit report lag in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, 
and Rwanda. A pooled regression analysis was used to identify the corporate governance factors 




 Discussion of the Findings 
This section discusses the findings of the study under each study objective 
 Difference in ARL among listed firms in the East African Community States 
From the descriptive statistics observed, Rwanda had the shortest ARL (86 days) while Tanzania 
had the longest (103 days). Kenya and Uganda had ARLs of 88 days and 99 days respectively.  
The early reporting in Rwanda could be explained by the early regulatory requirement to submit 
tax returns not later than 90 days after year-end.  
The Income Tax Law, No. 16/2005 requires that all companies operating in Rwanda file their 
Income tax returns by 31 March of the following tax period, (ninety days or three months after 
year end). A mean ARL of 86 days ARL indicates compliance to the tax regulations. 
In Tanzania, the Income Tax Act, Cap 332, section 91 requires that all companies file their Income 
tax returns within three months (ninety days or three months) of the end of every financial year. A 
mean ARL of 103 days indicates that some companies in Tanzania are non-compliant.  
The Income Tax Act, Cap 470 of Kenya and the Income Tax Act, Cap 340 of Uganda require that 
all companies operating in Kenya and  Uganda respectively file their self-assessment returns within 
six months (180 days) of the end of every financial year. The mean ARLs of 88 days and 99 days 
indicated compliance to the tax regulations.  
Studying the influence of Corporate governance on foreign investments in Tanzania, Nyaki, (2013) 
observed poor enforcement of laws and regulations. This led to a weak corporate governance 
framework. In 2016, the World Bank ranked Rwanda as the best country within East Africa to do 
business, (World Bank Doing Business Report, 2016). The report focused on governance and 
trade. The findings could imply that corporate governance framework in Rwanda is stronger than 
it is in Tanzania. Studies by Owino (2017) on the drivers of ARL among listed companies between 
2006 and 2015 revealed that Kenyan companies had an average ARL of 87 days, one day shorter 
than this current study. The one day difference may be explained by the difference in the data 
analyzed, whereas Owino omitted all companies listed after 2006, the current study included all 
companies listed before and after 2007. 
An industry analysis revealed that in Kenya, the telecommunication and technology sector had the 
shortest ARL, (49 days) while automobiles and accessories industry had the longest ARL (103 
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days). Each of these industries had one listed company, Safaricom Limited plc, and Car and 
General plc. Apart from the tax regulation in Kenya, the telecommunication and technology sector 
is highly regulated by the Communications Authority of Kenya. The automobiles and accessories 
sector is not highly regulated; this could explain the difference in the ARLs. 
In Uganda, the manufacturing and allied Industry had the shortest ARL (51 days) while the 
construction and allied industry had the longest ARL (137 days). The only listed manufacturing 
and allied company in Uganda is British American Tobacco (BAT) while the only listed 
construction and allied company is Uganda Clay Limited. BAT is 70% owned by the parent 
company, British American Tobacco Investments Limited, London while Uganda Clay Limited is 
85% owned by local institutions and individuals. The ownership structure could have an influence 
on ARL and that foreign-owned companies tend to report sooner. 
In Tanzania, the construction and allied Industry had the shortest ARL, (82 days) while the Energy 
and Petroleum industry had the longest ARL, (192 days). This study observes that Tanzania has 
the longest ARL in EA. 
In Rwanda, the Banking Industry had the shortest ARL (80 days) while both the 
telecommunication and technology and manufacturing and allied industries had ARLs of 86 days. 
These findings were consistent with Abidin & Ahmad-Zaluki, (2012) who found that compared to 
other sectors, banks had the shortest ARL in Malaysia (77 days). The only listed bank in Rwanda 
was Bank of Kigali. In Rwanda, banks are regulated by the National Bank of Rwanda. Article 71, 
of Law No. 48/2017 requires banks to provide the audited financials to the National Bank of 
Rwanda when requested to. There is no publishing timelines in Rwanda.  
 Corporate governance determinants of Audit Report Lag (ARL).  
A Pooled Regression analysis revealed that: In Kenya, the number of independent directors in the 
board, directors’ tenure, gender diversity, and presence of the CEO in the audit committee, 
frequency of audit committee meetings and the auditor type were the significant determinants of 
ARL. This was evidenced by the significant t-statistic (p<0.05).  
In Tanzania, the board size, directors’ tenure, audit committee financial expertise the auditor type 




In Uganda, the audit committee independence and audit committee financial expertise were the 
significant determinants of ARL. This was evidenced by the significant t-statistic (p<0.05).  
In Rwanda, none of the variables is significantly related to ARL, the t- statistic for all the variables 
is greater than 0.05 (p>0.05). This implies that there exist other determinants of ARL in Rwanda 
other than corporate governance factors. 
5.3.2.1 Board Size 
From the study findings, board size significantly influences ARL in Tanzania. Boards with more 
than eight directors had shorter ARLs, consistent with observations by Abdul-Rahman & 
Mohamed-Ali (2006) and Akhtaruddin, Hossain, & Yao, (2009) who argued that larger board sizes 
have collective expertise and are more capable of executing their duties. Hussainey and Wang, 
(2010) further observed that such boards have minimal management supervision. Also, Jensen 
(1993) observed that boards with eight members had efficient and effective performance while 
Ezat and El-Masry (2008) reported shorter ARLs in companies with large boards. An increase in 
the board size by one director implies that the ARL in Tanzania will reduce by 37 days.  
5.3.2.2 Board Independence 
In the Kenya, board independence significantly influenced ARL. Directors’ independence was 
positively related to ARL.  These findings contradicted findings by John and Senbet (1998); 
Duchin et al (2010); Fama and Jensen (1983) and Afify, (2009) and imply that more independent 
boards (more than a third of board directors being independent), may not likely act better in the 
best interest of the shareholders. An increase in the independent directors by one implies that the 
ARL in Kenya, 10 days. 
5.3.2.3 Director’s Tenure. 
Directors’ tenure significantly influences ARL in Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya, directors’ tenure 
is negatively related to ARL. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, (2002) suggested that a new directors 
may be overly deferential while long-tenured directors may have more information and experience, 
hence faster monitoring implying a shorter ARL. In Tanzania Director’ tenure was positively 
related to ARL.  Katz (1982) found that extended tenure reduced intra group communication, and 
isolates groups from key information sources implying slower monitoring and longer ARLs. 
An increase in the director’s tenure by one year implies that the ARL in Kenya will decrease by 8 
days and increase in Tanzania by 22 days.  
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5.3.2.4 Gender Diversity 
In Kenya, there was a significant negative relation between board gender diversity and ARL; this 
was consistent with findings by Odit (2013) studying ARL in Kenya. This was consistent with 
findings by (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). In 2009, Adams and Ferreira observed that when women 
are involved in monitoring related committees, firms observe increased transparency. 
Additionally, boardroom gender diversity is positively related to audit effort and may reduce the 
ARL (Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011). An increase in the number of female directors by one implies 
that the ARL in Kenya would decrease by 14 days. 
5.3.2.5 Audit Committee Independence. 
The relation between audit committee independence and ARL is significant among Uganda listed 
companies.  Audit committee independence is positively related to ARL in Uganda. This implies 
the more independent the audit committee is, the longer financial report lag. These findings 
contradict the proponents of the agency theory, who argue that independent audit committees are 
less likely to be compromised and that they work for the benefit of the shareholders. Furthermore, 
a more independent audit committee is better placed in dealing with external auditor and mediation 
of disputes, shortening the ARL(Klein, 2002 and Bedard, Chtourou & Courteau, 2004). 
An increase in the audit committee independence by one director implies that the ARL in Uganda 
would increase by 64 days. 
5.3.2.6 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
Financial expertise of the audit committee has a significant, positive relation to ARL Kenya and 
Tanzania. This findings are consistent with conclusions by Emeh, (2013) studying the Nigerian 
listed companies but contradict the Agency theorists who argue that audit committee members 
with financial expertise enhance the audit committee’s ability by ensuring that the work of the 
external auditors is competently done, reducing ARL. An audit committee with financial expertise 
implies that the ARL in Kenya and Tanzania would increase ARL by 2 and 25 days respectively.  
5.3.2.7 CEO in Audit Committee 
The presence of the CEO in the audit committee has a significant, negative association with ARL 
in Kenya. The CEO present in the audit committee is more concerned with strategic, operational 
and financing decisions Bertrand & Schoar, (2003) and financial reporting decisions, (Bamber et 
al., 2010 and Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). They also have sufficient knowledge and 
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experience about the audit processes, hence the annual audit proceeds promptly, with fewer errors 
and required adjustments (Jiang et al., 2013). The presence of the CEO in the audit committee 
implies that the ARL in Kenya reduced by 9 days.  
5.3.2.8 Audit Committee Meetings. 
In Kenya and Uganda, the frequency of audit committee meetings is significant but negatively 
related to ARL. These findings are consistent with observations (Mohamad-Nor et al. 2010, 
Abernathy et al. 2011, Wan-Hussin and Bamahros 2013). Research by Krishnan & Visvanathan, 
(2007) reveal that a more industrious audit committee is less likely to issue fraudulent financial 
reports and is more likely to detect and report internal control weaknesses reducing audit time. 
Recent financial reporting timeliness predict an inverse association between audit committee 
financial expertise and financial reporting timeliness (Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010; Abernathy et al. 
2011 and Wan-Hussin & Bamahros 2013). An extra audit committee meeting implies that the ARL 
in Kenya and Uganda would reduce by 15 and 2 days respectively.  
5.3.2.9 Auditor Type.  
The auditor type has a significant, but negative relation to ARL in Kenya and Tanzania. These 
findings are consistent with observations by Leventis et al. (2005); Apadore and Mohd Noor, 
(2013); Alali and Elder, (2014) and Ahmed and Che-Ahmad, (2016). Compared to companies 
audited by other audit firms, listed companies in Kenya and Tanzania audited by Deloitte, KPMG, 
EY, and PWC have shorter ARL’s. The study suggests that if a listed company in Kenya and 
Tanzania is audited by a big 4 audit firm, its ARL would reduce by 36 and 47 days.  
 Relevance of ARL in investment decisions 
Descriptive statistics were used to establish the relevance of audit report lag in investment making 
decisions in the East Africa Community States. The findings from the questionnaire were analyzed 
and it is evident that investors in the East African region rely on published financial accounts to 
make investment decisions (see tables 4.26 and 4.27). 
The study observes that published financial statement are a significant source of information 
necessary for investment decisions in East Africa, observed mean of 4.35, standard deviation of 
0.8. More than 92% of the respondents agreed that published financial statement are a significant 
source of information for them to invest. These observation could imply that developing markets 
are characterized by limited financial information and investors significantly rely on the published 
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reports to make decisions (Afify, 2009). Delay in releasing financial statement brings about 
uncertainty as information needed to make decisions is contained in the financial statements 
(Ashton, Graul, & Newton, 1989). Knechel and Payne (2001) noted that longer audit report lags 
were associated with lower information quality. Also, unwarranted delays in releasing financial 
statements increases uncertainty associated with investment decisions (Ashton et al., 1987). In 
times of delay; the market speculates presence of bad news being concealed by managers of the 
company (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991). One way of delaying bad news is delaying the audit report 
(Alkhatib & Marji, 2012; Patrick & Benjamin, 1994). Timely corporate financial reporting is an 
essential ingredient for a well-functioning capital market (Ettredge et al., 2005). The accounting 
profession has recognized that the timeliness of reports is an essential quality to the users of 
financial information (Soltani, 2002).  
 Conclusion 
Guided by the agency theory, stakeholder theory and resource- dependency theory, this study 
provides empirical evidence on the relevance of audit report Lag and its corporate governance 
determinants on listed companies in the East African Community States.  
There is a significant difference in audit report lags in the four countries, Rwanda has the shortest 
ARL (86 days) while Tanzania has the longest ARL (103 days). The findings suggest that varying 
ownership structures (foreign or local), regulatory framework, and industry could influence the 
length of ARL in the East African Community States. 
The significance of the corporate governance determinants on audit report lag differed from 
country to country. In Kenya, the number of independent directors in the board, directors’ tenure, 
gender diversity, presence of the CEO in the audit committee, frequency of audit committee 
meetings and the auditor type were the significant determinants of ARL. This was evidenced by 
the significant t-statistic (p<0.05). In Tanzania, the board size, directors’ tenure, audit committee 
financial expertise and the auditor type were the significant determinants of ARL. This was 
evidenced by the significant t-statistic (p<0.05). In Uganda, the audit committee independence and 
audit committee financial expertise were the significant determinants of ARL. This was evidenced 
by the significant t-statistic (p<0.05). In Rwanda, none of the variables is significantly related to 
ARL, the t- statistic for all the variables is greater than 0.05 (p>0.05). This implies that there exist 
other determinants of ARL in Rwanda other than corporate governance factors. 
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The observations from the primary data analyzed suggested that investors in the East African 
Community States rely on published financial reports for investment decisions, this findings were 
consistent with observations by Afify, (2009) who opined that in developing nations, limited 
financial information characterize the securities markets and investors significantly rely on the 
published reports to make decisions. 
This study finds that the knowledge of the determinants of ARL is essential for listed companies 
in East African Community States for promoting capital market efficiency. 
 Research implications  
 To regulators 
The study provide insight to policymakers and regulators on the specific corporate governance 
determinants influencing ARL  that influence audit report lag within the EAC states.  
The relevance of ARL and high dependence on published financials by investors justify the 
resources spent in implementing policies and regulations within the EAC states by the regulators 
 To researchers and academicians 
The study extends to literature the knowledge of the relevance and determinants of corporate 
governance determinants ARL in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda. To the best knowledge 
of the researcher, audit report lag has not been studied in Ugandan, Tanzanian and Rwanda 
 To Investors 
Given the importance of published financials, investors can adjust their market preferences in good 
time and choose the market to invest in.  
 To Auditors 
Understanding the corporate governance factors influencing ARL in the EAC states is likely to 
provide more insights into audit efficiency (Leventis, Weetman, & Caramanis, 2005; Walker & 
Hay, 2007). The relevance of ARL for investment decisions should motivate auditors to promptly 
perform their audit procedures.  
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 Contribution to knowledge  
This study builds on to the existing corporate governance and audit report lag empirical literature 
by determining the corporate governance factors that influence audit report lag in East Africa.  
Also, with the opening up of the East African Capital market, the comparison of the four countries 
ARL’s should inform investors on when and where to invest.   
 Limitations of the study  
Based on the objectives of the study, the empirical literature investigated the relationship between 
audit report lag and the eleven variables that were thought to be the most relevant based on 
previous empirical studies. This study restricts itself to these eleven corporate governance factors. 
Company- related characteristics, auditor-related characteristics and the wider economic and 
institutional factors of law enforcement, governance and commerce that remarkably influence 
auditing processes are not considered. The effectiveness of the board of directors and the audit 
committee may also be affected by the organizational context in which they operate since they do 
not operate alone in an organization (Turley and Zaman, 2004). 
Second, this study reviews the effectiveness of corporate governance factors only from externally 
available information (annual financial report). This study did not use other measures of 
effectiveness that would have enhanced interaction with the board of directors and audit committee 
members like surveys or interviews.  
5.6 Areas of further studies  
The study was limited to corporate governance factors influencing ARL in the East Africa 
Community States. Other corporate governance- related, company-related and auditor- related 
drivers of ARL should be studied within the East African region. The study relied heavily on 
annual reports as the main source for the drivers of ARL, data collection techniques that enhance 
interactions with the board of directors and audit committee members like surveys or interviews 
can be used as board and audit committee effectiveness may be influenced by the organizational 
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Appendix. 1: Questionnaire 
Dear Participant,  
My name is Grace Wanjiku Gacheru a Master of Commerce student at Strathmore University researching 
“The Relevance of Audit Report Lag and its Corporate Governance determinants among listed 
companies in the East African Community States.” At this point of my proposal, I am concerned with 
collecting data from investment analysts, stockbrokers and senior finance executives of listed companies 
that should lead to insights and recommendations for practitioners, investors and Academicians. Your 
contribution will go a long way in achieving the objectives of this study. I would be grateful if you could 
spare some time to fill this questionnaire. I assure you that all information provided for this study will be 
treated with strict confidentiality and will be used for the sole purpose of this research. For any queries, my 
contacts are: gacheru.grace@strathmore.edu or gracegacheru@gmail.com 
Section 1: General Information 
The information in this section will serve as background to the answers that will be provided in the other 
sections.  
1. Kindly tick against your gender. Male [ ] Female [ ]  
2. Kindly indicate your main occupation?  
Finance manager [ ] Accountant [ ] Internal auditor [ ] External auditor [ ]  
Other ………………………………  
3. Length of experience in this position?  
4. Less than 1 year [ ] between 1 to 4 years [ ] between 5 to 10 years [ ] between 11 to 15 years [ ] Over 15 
years [ ]  
5. In how many countries within East Africa is your company listed? ………………… 
6. Which professional certification do you hold? (CPA, ACCA, CFA, CFE, etc.)…………............. 
Section 2: Corporate Governance Related Factors 
The purpose of this section is to establish the CG factors that influence ARL that. Please indicate the extent 











Disagree  Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Auditors tend to take longer to release audit 
reports for companies with more than five 
board members  
     
Board size does not affect the time taken to 
release audit reports  
     
Auditors take longer period to release audit 
reports for companies with  of three or more 
independent members 
     
Auditors take longer to release audit reports 
for companies where the board Chairman 
has served for more than ten years   
     
Auditors take a longer period to release audit 
reports for companies with directors who 
have served as directors before  
     
Auditors take a longer period to release audit 
reports for companies with directors who 
have financial expertise  
     
Auditors tend to take longer to release audit 
report for companies with more than a third 
of the board members being from one 
gender. 
     
The gender of the board members does 
not affect the time taken to release the 
audit report. 
 
     
Auditors take longer to release audit report 
for companies with more than three audit 
committee members. 
     
Auditors take longer to release audit report 
for companies with more than three 
independent directors in the audit 
committee. 
     
Auditors take longer to release reports for 
companies whose audit committee 
chairpersons are financial experts. 
     
Auditors take longer to release audit reports 
for companies with the CEO as members of 
the audit committee 
     
Auditors tend to take longer to release audit 
reports where the audit committee meets 
more than three times in a year.  
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Section 3: Relevance of Audit Report Lag to users of financial statements 
The purpose of this section is to establish the relevance of ARL to the users of financial statements. Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by ticking the cell that 
corresponds to your choice 




Disagree  Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
The time taken for the auditor to review and 
sign greatly influences investment 
decisions.   
     
Early signing of auditor’s report enhances 
the quality of financial reporting. 
     
Investment decisions are influenced by 
financial reporting timelines set by the 
various regulators.   
     
Published financials are a major source of 
information necessary for investment 
decisions. 
     
There is a high preference of investing in the 
financial services sector (banking and 
insurance). 
     
There is a higher preference of investing in 
the Consumer and Industrial markets 
(FMCG, Telecommunication, Energy, etc.) 
     
 




Section 3: Time taken by auditors to release audit report 
8. In your opinion what is the average time it takes auditors to complete an audit?  
Between 0-30 days [ ] between 31- 60 days [ ] between 61 – 90 days [ ] between 91-120 days [ ] between 
120-150 days [ ]  
Other …………………  
9. What factors do you think influence the time taken to release the audit report by auditors? 
 




Appendix. 2: Listed Companies in East Africa 
Listed companies in Kenya as at 31 December 2016 Listed companies in Uganda 
as at 31 December 2016 
Listed companies in Tanzania 
as at 31 December 2016 
Listed companies in 
Rwanda as at 31 
December 2016 
Rea Vipingo Ltd Athi River Mining Ltd British American Tobacco Mkombozi Commercial Bank Braliwa 
Sasini Tea and Coffee Ltd Bamburi Cement Bank Of Baroda Maendeleo Bank Bank of Kigali 
Kakuzi Ltd Crown Berger (K) DFCU Mwalimu Commercial Bank Crystal Telcom 
Eaagads EA Portland Cement NVPP Tol Gases Limited Equity 
Williamson Tea Kenya EA Cables Stanbic Bank Tanzania Breweries Limited Nation Media Group 
Kapchorua Tea KenolKobil National Insurance Corporation Tanzania Cigar Jubilee 
Limuru Tea Company Total Kenya Uganda Clay Limited Tanga Cement Kenya Commercial Bank 
Car and General KenGen Umeme Swissport Uchumi 
Kenya Airways Umeme Limited East African Breweries Limited Twiga Portland Cement   
Uchumi Supermarkets KPLC Kenya Commercial Bank Dar es Salaam Community Bank   
Nation Media Group Sanlam Holdings Equity Bank Plc National Microfinance Bank   
TPS (Serena) Jubilee Insurance Jubilee Insurance CRBD Bank Plc   
Scan Group Liberty Kenya Airways Plc African Barric Gold   
Standard Group Kenya Re-Insurance Nation Media Group Precision   
Sameer Africa Plc Britam Holdings Centum Investments Swala Gas and Oil   
Express Ltd CIC Insurance Group Uchumi East African Breweries Limited   
Longhorn Publishers Centum Investment  Kenya Commercial Bank   
Atlas Development Olympia Capital  Jubilee Insurance   
Deacons Trans-century  Kenya Airways Plc   
Nairobi Business Venture Home Africa  Uchumi   
Barclays Bank of Kenya Kurwitu     
CFC Stanbic Bank BOC Kenya      
Kenya Commercial Bank British American Tobacco      
National Bank of Kenya Carbacid Investments      
Diamond Trust Bank of Kenya East African Breweries Ltd      
Standard Bank Mumias Sugar Company      
NIC Bank Unga Group      
Equity Bank Eveready East Africa      
Co-operative Bank of Kenya Kenya Orchards      
I&M Holdings Flame Tree Group      
Housing Finance Group 
Safaricom 
Stanlib Fahari      
      
 
